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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, energy conservation has been a hot topic of debate among policy makers and
researchers due to the concerns about global climate change and energy dependency. In the
1970s, the energy crisis has led to a growing attention on energy dependency and a possible
depletion of fossil fuels. Currently, climate change has emerged as one of the most important
policy issues, and energy conservation is promoted as a remedy to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. From a policy perspective, residential sector has been an important target for
energy conservation policies as it is a major contributor to the total energy consumption
and has a high potential for saving energy through efficiency measures.
Many countries have introduced regulations targeting the energy efficiency of the
residential sector. However, whether these policies have been effective in reducing the
total residential consumption of energy is still unclear. In the first chapter of this thesis, we
analyze the impact of residential energy efficiency policies on household energy consumption
across Europe for the period 1980-2009. We examine the electricity and non-electricity
energy consumption separately, as these are generally used for different purposes (appliances
and heating) by households and are subject to different energy efficiency policies. We focus
on two distinct types of regulations – mandatory energy efficiency labels for household
appliances and building standards. We find that after controlling for the county-specific
effects and the changes in income, energy prices, demography and climate conditions over
our sample period, both the energy labeling requirements for appliances and the stricter
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building codes lead up to lower residential energy consumption.
In the second chapter, we examine how households respond to energy efficiency
measures. Policies designed to reduce energy consumption through energy efficiency
measures in the residential sector are typically based upon engineering calculations, which
may differ significantly from outcomes observed in practice. A widely acknowledged
explanation for this gap between expected and realized energy savings is household
behavior, as energy efficiency gains alter the perceived cost of comfort and may thereby
generate shifts in consumption patterns – a “rebound effect”. This chapter adds to the
ongoing discussion about the method of identification and the magnitude of this effect, by
examining the elasticity of energy consumption relative to a predicted measure of thermal
efficiency, using a sample of 563,000 dwellings and their occupants in the Netherlands.
The results show a rebound effect of 26.7 percent among homeowners, and 41.3 percent
among tenants. There is significant heterogeneity in the rebound effect across households,
determined by household wealth and income, and the actual energy use intensity (EUI).
The effects are largest among the lower income and wealth cohorts, and among households
that use more energy than the average household. We corroborate our findings through
a quasi-experimental analysis, documenting that efficiency improvements following a large
subsidy program lead to a rebound effect of about 56 percent. This confirms the important
role of household behavior in determining the outcomes of energy efficiency improvement
programs.
In the last chapter, we investigate financial aspects of energy efficiency investments in
the housing market. Much of the current policy making hinges on the assumption that
markets efficiently capitalize home energy performance into transaction prices. However,
there is limited empirical evidence supporting this assumption. We use transaction data
for a large sample of dwellings to examine the capitalization of energy efficiency in the
housing market. Using the exogenous variation in energy efficiency generated by 1973-74
oil crisis, as well as the evolution of building codes as instruments, we document that a 50
percent increase in energy efficiency leads to an increase in the transaction price by around
11 percent for an average home in the Dutch housing market. Our findings indicate that
the capitalization of energy efficiency does not vary significantly when Energy Performance
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Certificates (EPC) are present. We document that the estimated value of energy efficiency
varies over time, which might be a consequence of fluctuations in house prices, increased
energy costs, and changing consumer awareness.
3
Chapter 2
The Impact of Policy on Residential
Energy Consumption
2.1 Introduction
Residential energy consumption has returned to the top of the agenda in academia, business
and policy. The first wave of residential energy debates of the early eighties succeeded a
severe oil crisis, which stressed the importance of energy efficiency from a political point
of view. Today, energy efficiency has regained importance, this time contending with the
outlook of depleting energy resources and the harmful effects of climate change that result
from increasing carbon dioxide emissions. Given that residential sector accounts for almost
40 percent of the EU’s total energy consumption, the residential sector is an obvious target
for energy conservation policies (Perez-Lombard et al., 2008). Within the EU, a wide
collection of policy instruments has been implemented over the years, all with the aim of
enhancing the energy efficiency of the residential sector. Among these, building standards
and mandatory energy labels for household appliances are the most common policy tools
that have been used by European countries over the last thirty years.
According to the Odyssee database, in 2012, nearly 67 percent of the total residential
energy consumption in EU is used for space heating.1 Therefore, minimum thermal
efficiency standards for new buildings are considered as one of the most important energy
1See http://www.odyssee-indicators.org
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conservation measures. Especially after the 1973-74 oil crisis, many countries have
introduced their first national building standards or strengthened the existing codes. The
importance of these standards also extends beyond their role in new dwellings. They are
also expected to have spillover effects on the existing dwelling stock as these standards also
serve as a benchmark for the energy efficiency refurbishments.
Energy efficiency in the appliance market is also an essential element in EU’s portfolio
of energy conservation policies. In order to facilitate the adoption of energy-efficient
technologies, the EU Commission issued the Directive 92/75/EC requiring the member
states to implement mandatory disclosure of energy labels in 1992. Following this directive,
national governments have gradually introduced labeling schemes for different appliance
groups. These energy-efficieny labeling regulations aim to remove the information barriers
to the diffusion of energy efficient products in the market. The lack of sufficient information
is generally accepted as one of the main reasons why households underinvest in energy
efficient technologies (Gillingham et al., 2009). In the absence of information, consumers
are not able to incorporate the operating costs into their purchasing decisions, which in
return leads to lower investments in energy efficient products. The provision of energy labels
may create market incentives for appliance manufacturers to design more energy-efficient
products (Mills and Schleich, 2010). Newell et al. (1999) document that the mean energy
efficiency of water heaters and air conditioners sold in the US increased significantly after
the introduction of the labeling scheme in 1975. Therefore, greater transparency may enable
both consumers and producers to incorporate energy efficiency in their decision-making
process.
However, whether the building standards and the labeling schemes have been effective
in reducing the total residential consumption of energy is still unclear. Thus far, the
impact of these energy efficiency regulations has been mostly studied by use of the so-called
bottom-up modeling approach, in which consumers are assumed to readily adopt new
technologies without adjusting their energy behavior. While these studies provide useful
ex-ante information on the potential impact of policies, they are not able to accurately assess
the actual outcome. The uptake of building standards may be less than expected if they are
poorly enforced or not stringent enough to be binding. Greening et al. (2000) argue that
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the voluntary uptake of energy efficiency innovations is modest, and part of the predicted
efficiency gains are offset by a shift in energy demand through the so-called “rebound effect”.
Considering the labeling regulations, even if the energy efficiency information is provided,
price-driven temptation can lead to purchase of an energy-inefficient appliance with a low
purchase price, in spite of its relatively high operating costs that will be incurred in the
future (Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2013). As a consequence of these, the actual impact of
energy efficiency regulations may well be lower than the expected.
The empirical evidence on the actual impact of these regulations is relatively scarce.
There are only a couple of studies investigating the “actual” effects of building standards
on residential energy consumption. Using a panel of 48 US states from 1970 to 2006,
Aroonruengsawat et al. (2012) analyze the impact of the introduction of state level building
codes. They find that the states, which adopted building codes, have experienced a
reduction in electricity use by around 3-5 percent in 2006. In a recent study, Jacobsen
and Kotchen (2013) find that the introduction of stricter building codes in Florida in 2002
has generated a 4 percent reduction in electricity use and 6 percent reduction in gas use for
the dwellings that are constructed after the implementation of these regulations. As far as
we know, there is not any study available in the literature, which investigates the actual
impact of energy labeling schemes on residential energy use. Many ex-post evaluations of
appliance labeling programs have focused on consumer awareness of the label and have not
explicitly examined the impact of these programs on actual behavior (Vine et al., 2001).
Our study contributes to this literature by using actual data from a sample of EU
countries and analyzing the impact of common policy indicators that are varying across
these countries and over time. We explore and examine the time series of the largest real
estate sector, the residential market across 13 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
UK) using three decades of data. We analyze the importance of various factors identified
by the available literature; income, energy prices, demography and climate. The main
contribution of our paper, however, lies in our analysis of the impact of two distinct types
of energy efficiency policies – the mandatory disclosure of energy labels for household
appliances and the stringency of building standards.
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Residential energy use can be mainly separated into two main components based on
the purpose of use: the energy used for space heating and the energy used by household
appliances (including lighting). We assume that non-electricity is mainly used for the first
and electricity is mainly used by household appliances and lighting.2 We track residential
electricity and non-electricity energy consumption separately, as these are covered by
different type of energy efficiency regulations. In order to examine the impact of building
standards on non-electricity energy consumption, we developed a policy indicator based
on the evolution of national U-value requirements, the measure for the thermal quality
of construction materials in new construction. As these requirements vary over time, we
are able to identify the impact of the building codes on residential energy consumption,
while controlling for unobserved country-specific factors. Similarly, we constructed a
policy indicator representing the extent of the mandatory labeling regulations. As the EU
governments gradually increased the product coverage of the labeling schemes, we are able
to identify the influence of the labeling requirements on residential electricity consumption.
Our results show that energy efficiency labeling policies in the appliance market and
stricter building standards lead to significant reductions in residential energy consumption.
According to the estimation results, if the government introduces mandatory disclosure of
energy labels for an appliance group that represent ten percent of households’ electricity
use, this leads to a decrease in per capita electricity use by around 0.2 percent in the
subsequent years. Similarly, given that U-values proxy the thermal quality of the new
dwellings (the insulation level of outer walls), and is calibrated as an inverse index, which
decreases as the thermal quality improves, we find that a 0.1 unit decrease in the U-value
requirement triggers a lasting 0.3 percent annual decrease in residential non-electricity
energy consumption. We also document that the impact of these regulations is stronger in
countries with higher shares of new appliances and constructions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the data and provide
the main statistics for our sample of countries. Section three explains the methodology
employed in the study. In section four, we present our empirical results both for electricity
2In some of the EU countries electricity heating systems are still very common. We take this into
account in the sample selection and the analysis.
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and non-electricity energy consumption, and subsequently examine the validity of these
results. In the final section, we conclude with a summary of our key findings and discuss
their policy implications.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Residential energy (electricity or non-electricity) consumption per capita for country i in
year t, cit, can be mainly described as a function of the energy price, pit, per capita income,
yit, annual heating and cooling degree-days as measures of the annual climatological demand
for heating and cooling, hddit, cddit, average demographic characteristics, dit, and the
energy efficiency level of the residential sector, eeit:
cit = f(pit, yit, hddit, cddit, dit, eeit) (2.1)
for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T .
An increase in income and/or the demand for heating-cooling are expected to increase
the consumption of residential energy. On the other hand, higher energy prices and
improved energy efficiency are expected to have an opposite impact. Therefore, residential
energy conservation policies are mostly designed in a way to alter these two factors.
Increasing the tax rates on energy consumption, improving the thermal quality of the
dwelling stock and the efficiency level of household appliances are the common policy
instruments that many countries have been implementing over the last three decades.
In this study, we specifically examine the impact of two main energy efficiency
regulations that are common across many EU countries: the stringency of building
standards, and the energy label requirement for household appliances. We analyze the
residential energy consumption by using a panel of 13 EU countries including Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the UK, covering the period from 1980 to 2009. The sample is selected
based on the availability of the data, and for the sake of comparability, we excluded the
countries where electricity is used as the main source of residential heating.
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Our dataset is gathered from different sources. We obtained the energy consumption
and tax-included real price data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). OECD
provides the data for the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is used as a proxy
for the per capita disposable income in the analysis. The series for heating degree-days, and
demographics are obtained from EUROSTAT database. We calculated the annual cooling
degree-days by using the average daily temperature data that is provided by Data Center
of US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).3 The policy variables
are constructed based on the information provided by the MURE database and national
sources.4
Figure 2.1 illustrates the cross-country variation of average per capita residential energy
consumption in 2009. The higher level of residential energy use in Northern countries
can be partly explained by the cold climate conditions. Besides that, the differences in
socio-economic conditions and the energy-efficiency level of the residential sector may also
explain the variation in the residential energy use for the countries with similar climate
conditions (e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands). There might also exist some unobserved
country-specific factors generating this variation. Therefore, in order to isolate the impact
of regulations from these unobserved country-specific factors, we pay attention to the
over-time variation instead of cross-country differences.
3According to the EUROSTAT, hdd is calculated as: hdd = 18◦C − Tm if Tm ≤ 15◦C and hdd = 0
if Tm > 15◦C, where Tm is the mean outdoor temperature realized during the day. cdd is calculated as:
cdd = Tm − 18.3◦C if Tm ≥ 18.3◦C and cdd = 0 if Tm < 18, 3◦C. Calculations are executed on a daily
basis and added up to a year.
4See “http://www.muredatabase.org/” for a detailed information about MURE database.
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Figure 2.1: Residential Energy Consumption per Capita across Europe (Kwh, 2009)
Source: International Energy Agency
Residential energy use can be mainly specified as a combination of the energy used
for space heating and the energy used by household appliances (including lighting). Due
to the absence of proper data for these two types of energy use, we approximate these
measures by separating the total residential energy use into two components: electricity
and non-electricity energy consumption. Figure 2.2 exhibits the change in the use of these
two energy sources from 1980 to 2009. For all countries in our sample, per capita residential
electricity consumption has increased over the last three decades. This change might be a
combined result of the socio-economic and technological developments that have drastically
changed household lifestyles. Considering the non-electricity component of residential
energy use, we observe that its use has increased for the Southern countries while it is the
other way around for the Northern countries. The decrease of non-electricity consumption
in Northern countries can be mainly explained by the change of climate conditions and the
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change in the energy efficiency level of the dwelling stock.5
Figure 2.2: Residential Electrcity and Non-electricity Consumption per Capita
Source: International Energy Agency
According to the ODYSSEE database, in 2008, nearly two-thirds of household energy
consumption in EU-27 countries is used for space heating.6 Therefore, one can expect
a close relationship between climate conditions and the amount of energy consumed by
households. In Figure 2.3, we plot the annual fluctuations in electricity and non-electricity
consumption against heating and cooling degree-days (HDD and CDD). Although there
appears to be some similarity between heating degree-days and non-electricity consumption
volatility, no compelling evidence is provided for a relationship between cooling degree-days
and residential electricity use. This can be expected since electrical cooling systems are
not very common in the sampled European countries.7
5Haas and Schipper (1998) point out that after the substantial decrease in residential energy demand
following the 1973-74 oil crisis, energy demand did not rebound when the energy prices declined considerably
in 1985. They suggest that irreversible efficiency improvements, which took place after the 1973-74 oil crisis,
might be a reason for this moderate change in energy demand in times of declining energy prices.
6See http://www.odyssee-indicators.org/
7According to the data provided by Odyssee database, in 2009, around 16 percent of households in our
sample of EU countries uses air conditioning equipment, while this share is around 83 percent in the US
according to the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS).
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Figure 2.3: Climate Indicators and Residential Energy Consumption per Capita
Source: International Energy Agency & EUROSTAT & NOAA
While there are only a couple of studies in the literature investigating the relationship
between energy efficiency regulations and residential energy consumption, there exist more
which focus on the effect of economic factors, e.g. income and price, as determinants
of residential energy demand. Over the time period we analyze, the average GDP level
in European countries has increased from a level of 22,000 USD to 35,000 USD, and
as pictured in Figure 2.4, the real energy prices have more than doubled over the last
three decades. Economic theory suggests that household income affects residential energy
demand positively, while the reverse is true regarding energy prices (Becker, 1965). Based
on these income and price elasticity assumptions, many countries have implemented energy
taxes as means of reducing consumption levels and carbon emissions. Therefore, in our
analysis, in order to isolate the impact of energy efficiency regulations, we control for the
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changes in income and energy prices.
Figure 2.4: Residential Energy Prices in Europe
Source: International Energy Agency
Over the last thirty years, many European countries have introduced regulations
targeting the energy efficiency of household appliances and dwellings. In this study, we
empirically estimate the impact of these energy efficiency regulations, and exploit the
over-time variation associated with the implementation and diffusion process. Firstly,
we analyze the impact of the introduction of energy labels on residential electricity
consumption. In 1992, the EU Commission introduced a framework directive on energy
labeling of electric appliances, which was followed by the introduction of implementing
directives targeting specific appliance groups.8 Based on these directives, each country
issued national regulations in the subsequent years. For each country in our sample, we
derived an index indicating the average electricity consumption share (in total residential
electricity use) of appliances that are subject to a mandatory labeling regulation, benefiting
from the over-time variation of the coverage of the labeling regulation.9 This variable takes
8The implementing EU directives are introduced for refrigerators, frozen food storage cabinets, food
freezers and their combinations in 1994, for washing machines and driers in 1995, for dishwashers in 1997,
for lamps in 1998, for air-conditioners and ovens in 2002 and for televisions in 2010.
9Each country implemented the labeling regulations by extending the appliance coverage over time. We
predicted the average electricity usage share of these appliances for each year based on the appliance-specific
energy consumption statistics provided by Dubin and McFadden (1984), and Larsen and Nesbakken (2004)
and the ownership statistics provided by Odyssee database.
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a maximum value of one if all household appliances in the market have to be sold with a
label according to legislations, and takes a minimum value zero if there is no regulation
for the disclosure of energy labels. In Figure 2.5, we present the over-time variation of
the label index and per-capita electricity consumption for each country in our sample of
analysis. Although the general trends look similar, there exist cross-country differences in
the evolution of the label index and electricity use. By exploiting these differences, we aim
to identify the impact of appliance labeling regulations on per-capita residential energy
demand in the following years.
Figure 2.5: Residential electricity Consumption and Coverage of Mandatory Energy Labels
Source: International Energy Agency & MURE Database
As a policy measure targeting the thermal efficiency of new dwellings, we examine the
influence of the stringency of building codes on the energy consumed for heating purpose
(non-electricity energy). The maximum allowable U-value requirement for external walls is
used as a proxy for the stringency of building codes. This U-value is consistently defined as
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the amount of heat loss through one square meter of the material for one-degree difference
in temperature at the either side of the material.10 The first U-value requirements were
implemented in Northern European countries during the 1960s, and were motivated by
the demand for thermal comfort. After the oil crisis in the early 1970s, many European
countries set or raised U-value requirements in order to reduce the residential energy
consumption and decrease their dependency to oil. Figure 2.6 plots the over-time variation
of the U-value requirements for the external walls of new construction in the sample of
analyzed countries, and clearly shows that the colder Northern European countries have
the strictest U-value requirements.
Figure 2.6: Residential Non-electricity Consumption and U-value Requirements
Source: International Energy Agency & MURE Database
10As an example; one square meter of a standard single glazed window transmits about 5.6 watts of
energy for each degree difference either side of the window and so has a U-Value of 5.6 W/m2. On the
other hand, a double glazed window has a U-value of 2.8 W/m2.
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2.3 Methodology
In order to analyze the dynamics of residential electricity and non-electricity energy
consumption (based on a standard constant elasticity demand function which is specified
in equation 2.1), we propose the following empirical model:
cit = β1pit + β2yit + β3hddit + β4cddit + β5dit + β6eeit + β6itit + αi + it (2.2)
for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T , where cit is the logarithm of per capita residential energy
(electricity or non-electricity) consumption, pit is the logarithm of tax-included real price
(USD/kWh) of the corresponding energy type, yit is the logarithm of income variable that
is proxied by per capita Gross Domestic Product in real terms (USD), hddit and cddit
are the logarithm of annual heating and cooling degree-days.11 We include the share of
elderly (age over 65) in the population, dit, as one of the most important demographic
characteristics expected to affect residential energy consumption, which is also verified
by some of the household level studies (Baker et al., 1989; Brounen et al., 2012). αi
represents the individual country fixed-effects and it is the error term assumed to be
distributed independently across countries and years. In order to eliminate the unobserved
country fixed-effects, we transform equation (2.2) into a first-difference model. The use of
first-differenced variables also enables us to take the existence of non-stationary variables
into account, which might lead to the estimation of spurious relationships between variables.
The first-difference specification of equation (2.2) can be written as below:
∆cit = γ1∆pit + γ2∆yit + γ3∆hddit + γ4∆cddit + γ5∆dit + γ6∆eeit + ∆it (2.3)
Our aim in this study is to identify the influence of energy efficiency regulations on
per capita residential energy use. Since the energy efficiency regulations are expected to
influence the energy efficiency level of the residential sector through the construction of
new dwellings and the purchase of new appliances, they are expected to have a cumulative
11Due to the data limitations, we use the unit price of gas as a proxy for the price of non-electricity
energy.
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effect on the energy efficiency level (and on the energy consumption in the subsequent
years). According to this, the impact of policy on residential energy efficiency level can be
described as below:
∆eeit = θ1policyit + θ2∆xit + ∆εit (2.4)
where, depending on the type of energy that is analyzed, policyit denotes either the legal
maximum U-value requirement for the external walls of the new buildings, or the share
of electricity that is used by the appliances that needs to be marketed with an energy
label.12 xit is a vector of potential determinants of energy efficiency, which are also
included in equation (2.3) as control variables (income, energy prices, climate conditions and
demographics). εit represents the error term which captures the unobserved determinants of
the residential energy efficiency. In order to measure the annual impact of energy efficiency
regulations on residential energy consumption, we transform equation (2.3) by replacing
the energy efficiency variable with equation (2.4):
∆cit = γ1∆pit + γ2∆yit + γ3∆hddit + γ4∆cddit + γ5∆dit + γ6policyit + ∆ξit (2.5)
Our estimation methodology is based on the assumption that residential energy efficiency
regulations are independent of the error term (ξit), which captures the unobserved
determinants of residential energy efficiency (εit) and the other unobserved factors that
might influence energy consumption (it). Unfortunately, due to the data limitations, we
are not able to test the validity of this assumption. However, we check the robustness of our
findings by applying different approaches. First, we examine the impact of these regulations
separately for sub-samples of countries having high or low shares of new appliances and new
construction. We expect a larger impact of energy efficiency regulations for the countries
with higher shares of new appliances and newly constructed dwellings. Second, as the
12In this model, we assume that the annual impacts of energy efficiency policies are constant during
our period of analysis. This assumption might seem unrealistic in case of a longer time horizon. As the
efficiency levels of the dwelling and appliance stocks increase over time, we can expect a decreasing impact
of the regulations. That is why, the policy coefficients need to be interpreted as the average annual impacts
of legislations between 1980 and 2009 for our sample of countries.
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over-time change in the usage of heating systems might be correlated with the evolution
of building standards, we include the share of electrical and gas heating systems in the
analysis of non-electricity consumption as control variables.
2.4 Empirical Results
We first estimate the model in equation (2.5) to investigate the impact of labeling
regulations on per capita residential electricity usage.13 The first column of Table 2.1
reports the estimation results for the 12 countries in our sample.14 Our results imply that
the introduction of mandatory energy efficiency certificates for household appliances has
a significant negative impact on residential electricity use. According to the estimated
coefficient, if the government introduces mandatory disclosure of energy labels for the
appliances that represent ten percent of households’ electricity use, this leads to an annual
decrease in per capita electricity use by around 0.2 percent in the subsequent years.
This result can be explained by policy-induced changes in the demand and supply of
energy-efficient products in the market. Given that consumers are willing to pay for
energy-efficient products conditional on the provision of information (Galarraga et al.,
2011), the mandatory disclosure of information on energy efficiency is expected to lead to
a shift in the supply of more energy-efficient appliances, and thus lead to lower residential
13We also estimate the linear regression model based on levels instead of a first-differenced variables.
In this model, we include country fixed-effects and country-specific linear time trends. We provide the
estimation results in Appendix Table 2.A.1. The estimated coefficients of policy variables are significantly
larger compared to first-differenced model. However, these coefficients are not easy to interpret as they
do not represent the annual impact of the regulations. They indicate the average difference in per capita
energy use between the time periods with different regulations. That is why, assuming that the policies have
cumulative impacts, we prefer to use first-differenced model which provides us coefficients that represent
the average annual impacts of legislations during our period of analysis.
14Due to the high share of electrical heating systems, and the extreme climate conditions, Finland has
a relatively much higher per-capita electricity consumption level compared to the other EU countries in
our sample (see Figure 2.2). Therefore, in order to avoid any distorting effects associated with the heating
demand, we do not include Finland in our analysis of electricity. In Appendix Table 2.A.2, we also report
the estimation results for electricity consumption including Finland. We do not find a significant difference
in the estimated policy impact compared to the estimate based on the sample without Finland.
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electricity use.15
Table 2.1: First-Difference Estimation Results
Electricity Non-Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.019***
[0.006]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.032***
[0.010]
∆Ln(Price) -0.015 0.018
[0.017] [0.033]
∆Ln(GDP) 0.216** 0.274
[0.086] [0.172]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.122*** 0.420***
[0.024] [0.049]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.002
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.029** -0.003
[0.012] [0.026]
Constant 0.020*** -0.024***
[0.003] [0.009]
R-square 0.116 0.203
Number of Observations 348 348
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
“Coverage of Label Policy” takes a maximum value of one if all household appliances in the market have to be sold with
a label according to legislations, and takes a minimum value zero if there is no regulation for the disclosure of energy
labels.
Since Finland has a relatively much higher per-capita electricity consumption level compared to the other EU countries
in our sample, we do not include Finland in our analysis of electricity.
We do not include Greece in our analysis of non-electricity energy consumption as there is no available data indicating
the over-time change in national U-value requirements.
We also find that electricity consumption is significantly affected by income (one percent
increase in income leads to a 0.22 percent increase in per capita residential electricity use),
a result which is plausible in light of previous studies for developed countries [the income
elasticities reported by the available literature are in the range of: 0.2-0.4 for the G7
15The policy results, which are provided in Table 2.1, are based on the assumption that the policy
indicators are not correlated with potential non-linear trends in unobserved determinants of residential
electricity use. In order to examine how the results differ when we control for common year-specific effects,
we introduce year fixed-effects in our model. In Appendix Table 2.A.3, when we include year fixed-effects
in our estimations, the impact of label policy becomes statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of
building standards remains significant. This indicates that the label policy might be correlated with other
non-linear time-varying common factors that affect residential electricity use. Another explanation might
be; as the evolution of coverage of label policy is very similar across our sample of countries, the impact of
over-time variation in the label policy is mostly captured by the year fixed-effects. Since both explanations
might be valid, we should be cautious while interpreting the estimated impact of label policy.
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countries by Narayan et al. (2007), 0.5 for the U.S. by Silk and Joutz (1997)]. Within our
sample, the price elasticity is found to be -0.15 (although not significant) which is within the
range of previous findings (between -0.04 and -2.25) reported by Espey and Espey (2004).16
We also find that the higher the number of heating degree-days, the higher the residential
use of electricity. According to the estimated coefficient, an increase of heating degree-days
of one percent results in an increase in residential energy demand of 0.12 percent. This
effect is probably caused by the use of electrical heating systems, which is more intense
during cold days. Considering the household cooling demand, we find that the number of
cooling degree-days does not have a significant impact on residential electricity use for our
sample of EU countries where the use of air conditioning is scarce. Finally, we document
that as the share of elderly individuals in the population increases by one percentage point,
per capita electricity consumption increases by around three percent, which is in line with
the findings of Barnes et al. (1981) and Brounen et al. (2012). Elderly people are more
inclined to spend time at home and use appliances during this time.17
In Column 2 of Table 2.1, we report the results for residential non-electricity energy
consumption.18 Here, we find significant evidence for the effect of stricter building standards
on per capita residential energy consumption. The higher the allowable maximum U-value
requirement for external walls, the higher the non-electricity energy consumption. Given
that U-values proxy the thermal quality of the new dwellings (the insulation level of
16The literature also identifiy a long-run relationship between residential electricity consumption, income
and energy prices (Narayan et al., 2007). Although our main objective in this study differs from this
literature, we also apply the cointegration framework (described in Apenndix B) in order to see how the
estimation results differ. According to the test statistics provided in Table 2.B.3, there is not a significant
cointegrating relationship between non-stationary variables. Assuming that there exist a cointegrating
relationship between consumption, income and energy prices as it is the case in Narayan et al. (2007), we
estimate an error correction model. The results that are reported in Table 2.B.4 confirm that there is not a
long run equilibrium between these variables, as the coefficients of the error correction terms are positive.
Considering the other coefficient estimates, we see that there is a positive long run impact of income on
residential electricity use. The results also imply that households respond to short run price changes in
electricity. Although the signs of the coefficients of policy variables are in line with the OLS results, they
are not statistically significant.
17We also examine whether the share of children and the share of female has a significant impact
on residential energy use. The results provided in Appendix Table 2.A.4 imply that share of children
significantly reduces the electricity use, while there is no evidence for the impact of share of females and
elderly in the population. These results needs to be interpreted carefully as the population share of children
and elderly are highly correlated.
18We do not include Greece in our analysis of non-electricity energy consumption as there is no available
data indicating the over-time change in national U-value requirements.
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outer walls), and is calibrated as an inverse index, which decreases as the thermal quality
improves, this result is both intuitive and significant. We find that a 0.1 unit decrease in the
U-value requirement results in a 0.3 percent annual decrease in residential non-electricity
energy consumption in the subsequent years. This impact is close to the engineering
expectations. For our sample of EU countries, the average annual dwelling construction rate
during the period of analysis is nearly three percent, and the average U-value requirement in
1980 is around 1 W/m2. We can assume that a 0.1 unit decrease in the U-value requirement
generates a 10 percent reduction in the required heating energy for the new dwellings built
after 1980 (ignoring the rebound effect). Multiplying this with the average rate of new
dwellings entering to the dwelling stock, we can expect that the regulation leads to a
0.3 percent annual reduction in the total residential heating energy consumption. The
prevalence of rebound and the spillover effects will have opposite effects on this expected
impact.
In line with our assumption that non-electricity energy is mainly used for space heating
purpose, we find stronger effects of heating degree-days on residential non-electricity energy
consumption. According to the estimated coefficient, if the number of heating degree-days
increases by one percent, per capita non-electricity energy consumption increases by around
0.4 percent. Our estimation results imply that non-electricity energy consumption is not
significantly associated with contemporaneous income and price changes. We suspect that
there might be a delay in households’ response to changes in income and energy prices.
As also pointed out by Ito (2014), households may receive energy bills at the end of
billing periods, and thus they may respond to lagged prices rather than contemporaneous
prices. It is also likely that energy prices have a lagged impact on residential energy
efficiency investments (purchase of energy-efficient appliances and investment on energy
efficiency retrofits), and thus on energy consumption. On the other hand, increased
income might have a delayed positive effect on energy consumption through the purchase
of additional appliances and/or the switch to more energy-consuming heating systems
that provide higher thermal comfort (switch from one-room heating equipment to central
heating systems). Therefore, in order to control for the lagged effects of income and
energy prices, we estimate the same model by including one-year lagged variables instead of
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contemporaneous variables. According to the results provided in Table 2.2, non-electricity
energy consumption is significantly affected by the lagged price and income changes. These
results imply a price elasticity of around six percent and an income elasticity of around 70
percent, which are significantly larger than the elasticities that we reported for electricity
usage. The other coefficient estimates are comparable to the estimates that are provided
in Table 2.1. In the subsequent analyses, we continue to use the lagged price and income
measures as control variables.19
Table 2.2: First-Difference Estimation Results: Including Laged Price and GDP
Electricity Non-Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.023***
[0.006]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.029***
[0.010]
Lag.∆Ln(Price) 0.000 -0.059*
[0.017] [0.033]
Lag.∆Ln(GDP) 0.190* 0.733***
[0.100] [0.203]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.109*** 0.407***
[0.023] [0.048]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.002
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.020* -0.007
[0.012] [0.026]
Constant 0.023*** -0.028***
[0.004] [0.009]
R-square 0.116 0.203
Number of Observations 348 348
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
“Coverage of Label Policy” takes a maximum value of one if all household appliances in the market have to be sold with
a label according to legislations, and takes a minimum value zero if there is no regulation for the disclosure of energy
labels.
Since Finland has a relatively much higher per-capita electricity consumption level compared to the other EU countries
in our sample, we do not include Finland in our analysis of electricity.
We do not include Greece in our analysis of non-electricity energy consumption as there is no available data indicating
the over-time change in national U-value requirements.
19Additional analysis show that our findings regarding the impacts of regulations do not depend on
whether lagged or current price and income variables are used as control variables. We also test the
robustness of our policy results to the use of lagged policy measures, as there might be a delay in the
implementation of regulations. When we include the lagged values of the policy measures instead of
current variables, the estimated impact of regulations is found to be not significantly different from the
previous estimates.
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In order to verify the validity of our policy findings, we also examine the impact of
regulations separately for countries having high and low shares of new appliances and
construction. If we are able to identify the impact of these regulations, we expect to find
a stronger impact for the countries where appliances and dwelling stock are rather new.
We first examine the impact of labeling regulations on residential electricity consumption.
Using the appliance ownership data provided by Odyssee, we separate our sample of
countries into two groups based on the electricity consumption share of new appliances
that are purchased by households after 2000.20 Our results (see Table 2.3) imply that the
impact of energy labeling schemes is indeed stronger (although not significantly different)
for the countries in which households’ adoption rate of new appliances between 2000-2009
is larger than the sample median.
20Odyssee provides annual data on the average share of appliance ownership for each type of appliance for
each country starting from 2000. Using this database and the statistics provided by Dubin and McFadden
(1984), and Larsen and Nesbakken (2004), we calculated the expected change in households’ average
electricity consumption from 1999 to 2009 for each country, which results from the purchase of new
appliances. The median expected change in electricity consumption for our sample of countries is 812
KWh. Based on this median value, we divide the countries in our sample into two sub-samples. The
countries for which the expected change is higher than the median level is considered as the countries
having a high level of new appliance stock.
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Table 2.3: First-Difference Estimation Results: Low-High Share of New Appliances
Low High
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.017** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.008)
Lag.∆Ln(Price) -0.026 0.024
(0.025) (0.024)
Lag.∆Ln(GDP) 0.065 0.237**
(0.187) (0.117)
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.120*** 0.098***
(0.035) (0.032)
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
∆Share of population over age 65 0.014 0.025
(0.018) (0.016)
Constant 0.021*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
R-square 0.096 0.154
Number of Observations 168 168
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Electricity consumption per capita).
We separate our sample of countries into two groups based on the electricity consumption share of new appliances that
are purchased by households after 2000.
“Coverage of Label Policy” takes a maximum value of one if all household appliances in the market have to be sold with
a label according to legislations, and takes a minimum value zero if there is no regulation for the disclosure of energy
labels.
Since Finland has a relatively much higher per-capita electricity consumption level compared to the other EU countries
in our sample, we do not include Finland in our analysis of electricity.
We employ a similar approach to examine the validity of our findings regarding the
impact of building standards. We assign the countries into two sub-samples based on their
average annual construction rates between 1980-2009. According to statistics provided by
Entranze Project, the median share of dwellings constructed during this time period is 33
percent of the existing dwelling stock for the countries in our sample.21 The countries having
a rate above this value are considered as high-construction countries and the countries
having a rate below this value are considered as low-construction countries. The results
that are provided in Table 2.4 indicate that the building standards have a larger (although
not significantly different) impact on residential energy use in high-construction countries.
For the low-construction countries, the estimated impact of building standards is lower and
21See http://www.entranze.enerdata.eu/
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statistically insignificant.22
Table 2.4: First-Difference Estimation Results: Low-High Share of New Constructions
Low High
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.008 0.031**
[0.014] [0.015]
Lag.∆Ln(Price) -0.098*** -0.021
[0.033] [0.055]
Lag.∆Ln(GDP) 0.556** 0.763***
[0.269] [0.282]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.705*** 0.209***
[0.055] [0.072]
∆Share of population over age 65 -0.025 0.053
(0.022) (0.057)
Constant -0.009 -0.038**
[0.011] [0.015]
R-square 0.541 0.139
Number of Observations 168 168
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Non-electricity energy consumption per capita).
We assign the countries into two sub-samples based on their average annual construction rates between 1980-2009. The
countries having a rate above median construction rate are considered as high-construction countries and the countries
having a rate below this value are considered as low-construction countries.
We do not include Greece in our analysis of non-electricity energy consumption as there is no available data indicating
the over-time change in national U-value requirements.
Finally, as a robustness check, we also consider the transition between energy sources
that are used for heating purposes. In some of the EU countries, the use of electricity as
a heating source has varied over time, which led to a change in residential non-electricity
consumption. In case this transition is correlated with the evolution of building standards,
the estimated impact of building standards might be biased. Therefore, we include the
over-time variation in the shares of heating systems as control variables in the analysis
of non-electricity energy consumption.23 According to the results provided in Table 2.5,
22Since there might be some differences in the energy consumption dynamics of low and high income
countries, we also examine these countries separately based on the median GDP level in 1980. According to
results provide in Appendix Table 2.A.5, the impact of building standards is only significant in low-income
countries, which might be associated to the higher construction rates in these countries. We find that the
impacts of price and heating degree days on residential non-electricity consumption is larger in high-income
countries. This might be related to the higher heating demand in northern countries, which are included
in the sample of high-income countries.
23Odyssee provides data on the shares of electrical and gas heating systems that are used by the
households. However, this data is not available for all years and countries in our sample.
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the estimated impact of building standards does not differ when we include the share of
electrical and gas heating systems. 24
Table 2.5: First-Difference Estimation Results: Controling for Share of Heating Systems
Dep. Variable: ∆Ln(Non-electricity Consumption per Capita) (1) (2)
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.032*** 0.032***
[0.011] [0.011]
∆Share of Dwellings with Electricity Heating -0.522 -0.530
[0.338] [0.346]
∆Share of Dwellings with Gas Heating 0.034
[0.354]
Lag.∆Ln(Price) -0.068* -0.071*
[0.039] [0.040]
Lag.∆Ln(GDP) 0.267 0.259
[0.222] [0.226]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.503*** 0.493***
[0.052] [0.053]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.017 0.018
[0.029] [0.029]
Constant -0.022** -0.022**
[0.009] [0.010]
R-square 0.445 0.432
Number of Observations 162 157
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Non-electricity energy consumption per capita).
We do not include Greece in our analysis of non-electricity energy consumption as there is no available data indicating
the over-time change in national U-value requirements.
The number of observations decreases considerably as the data on heating equipment is missing for some countries and
years.
2.5 Conclusions
Energy efficiency improvements in the residential sector can play an essential role in the
reduction of global carbon emissions. Accordingly, over the last three decades, many
countries have introduced regulations targeting the energy efficiency of the residential
sector. Among these, stricter building codes and mandatory disclosure of energy efficiency
information for household appliances have been the most common policy instruments.
24In Appendix, Table 2.A.6, we include the share of electricity heating systems as a control variable
in our model for electricity consumption. The coefficient of share of electricity heating systems is not
statistically significant.
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However, whether these policies have been effective in reducing the total residential energy
consumption is still unclear. Thus far, the impact of these energy efficiency regulations
has been mostly studied by use of the so-called bottom-up modeling approach, in which
market agents are assumed to readily adopt new standards without adjusting their energy
behavior. While these studies provide useful ex-ante information on the potential impact of
policies, they have some limitations to accurately assess the actual outcome. Their results
might be misleading if the policies are not perfectly adopted by the target group or if
households change their behavior as a response to the prospective efficiency improvements.
In this paper, using actual data from a sample of thirteen EU countries, we analyze the
impact that energy efficiency policy has had on household energy consumption during the
period 1980-2009. We measure and track the time variation of labeling requirements for
household appliances and the stringency of building standards, and study their impact on
the per capita residential energy use. We examine the electricity and non-electricity energy
consumption separately, as these are generally used for different purposes (appliances and
heating) and are subject to different energy efficiency policies.
Our results underline the importance of residential efficiency policies in reaching the EU
policy targets regarding primary energy and CO2 emissions. We find that a ten percent
increase in the coverage of mandatory labeling regulation (in terms of energy consumed by
household appliances) results in a 0.2 percent annual reduction in the per capita residential
electricity use in subsequent years. For policy makers, this result may help in stimulating
more extensive dissemination of energy labels. Similarly, our results suggest that stricter
building codes lead up to lower residential energy consumption. A 0.1 unit decrease in the
maximum allowable U-value, which corresponds to a ten percent reduction in the energy
required to heat a building constructed in 1980, leads up to a 0.3 percent annual decrease in
total non-electricity energy use in the following period. This confirms that the residential
sector in EU countries has a high potential for saving energy by lowering the heating
demand through insulation measures. We also document that, in markets where the share
of new appliance and new construction is high, the effects of these regulations are stronger.
Although we provide some evidence on the impact of residential energy efficiency
regulations on actual energy consumption, we are not able to explore the underlying
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mechanism through which the regulations influence the residential energy use. Detailed
information on market agents’ preferences, decisions and actions would allow us to further
disentangle the influence of these regulations. This is left for future research.
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Appendix
2.A Suplementary Tables
Table 2.A.1: OLS Estimation Results: Models in Levels
Electricity Non-Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.120***
[0.025]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.122**
[0.052]
Ln(Price) -0.019 -0.045*
[0.020] [0.027]
Ln(GDP) 0.514*** 0.746***
[0.078] [0.144]
Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.113** 0.320***
[0.048] [0.087]
Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.003
[0.004]
Share of population over age 65 -0.003 -0.023
[0.007] [0.014]
Constant 0.020*** -0.024***
[0.003] [0.009]
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes
Country-specific liner time trends Yes Yes
R-square 0.980 0.966
Number of Observations 360 360
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Table 2.A.2: First-Difference Estimation Results: Sample Including Finland
Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.022***
[0.006]
∆Ln(Price) -0.016
[0.016] ]
∆Ln(GDP) 0.173**
[0.079]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.137***
[0.023]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.001
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.028**
[0.012]
Constant 0.023***
[0.003] ]
R-square 0.128
Number of Observations 377
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Table 2.A.3: First-Difference Estimation Results: Including Year Fixed-effects
Electricity Non-Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) 0.021
[0.023]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.031***
[0.011]
∆Ln(Price) -0.022 0.021
[0.029] [0.045]
∆Ln(GDP) 0.103 0.401
[0.125] [0.258]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.047 0.263***
[0.034] [0.073]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.000
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.040*** -0.012
[0.012] [0.028]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Constant 0.022* -0.046*
[0.011] [0.024]
R-square 0.260 0.312
Number of Observations 348 348
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Table 2.A.4: First-Difference Estimation Results: Additional Demographic Controls
Electricity Non-Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.012*
[0.006]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.030***
[0.011]
∆Ln(Price) 0.007 -0.047
[0.017] [0.031]
∆Ln(GDP) 0.120 0.818***
[0.101] [0.199]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.099*** 0.386***
[0.023] [0.046]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.002
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.009 -0.000
[0.012] [0.025]
∆Share of population below age 15 -0.036*** 0.007
[0.009] [0.020]
∆Share of female -0.023 0.054
[0.048] [0.103]
Constant 0.013*** -0.031***
[0.004] [0.009]
R-square 0.150 0.256
Number of Observations 326 326
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Table 2.A.5: First-Difference Estimation Results: High-Low Income Countries
Electricity Non-electricity
Low-income High-income Low-income High-income
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.024*** -0.029***
[0.008] [0.009]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.030** 0.006
[0.013] [0.020]
Lag.∆Ln(Price) -0.030 0.008 -0.008 -0.133***
[0.021] [0.025] [0.048] [0.041]
Lag.∆Ln(GDP) 0.149 0.062 0.719*** 0.548
[0.100] [0.214] [0.243] [0.359]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.101*** 0.164*** 0.144** 0.728***
[0.029] [0.037] [0.067] [0.062]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.002 0.002
[0.002] [0.003]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.011 0.018 0.036 -0.031
[0.017] [0.018] [0.043] [0.030]
Constant 0.032*** 0.021*** -0.038*** -0.005
[0.005] [0.006] [0.014] [0.015]
R-square 0.124 0.160 0.124 0.499
Number of Observations 196 168 168 168
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Table 2.A.6: First-Difference Estimation Results: Including Heating Type
Electricity
Coverage of Label Policy (between 0 and 1) -0.008
[0.007]
∆Share of Dwellings with Electricity Heating 0.302
[0.203]
∆Ln(Price) -0.020
[0.023]
∆Ln(GDP) 0.292**
[0.126]
∆Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.088***
[0.031]
∆Ln(Cooling Degree-days) 0.002
[0.002]
∆Share of population over age 65 0.302
[0.203]
Constant 0.011**
[0.005]
R-square 0.100
Number of Observations 181
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
The number of observations decreases considerably as the data on heating equipment is missing for some countries and
years.
Finland is included in the sample as we control for share of electricity heating.
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2.B Cointegration Analysis
We also estimate our model using recently developed panel data econometric techniques,
which allow us to deal with the existence of non-stationary variables, with heterogeneous
effects, and with the cross sectional dependence across panel members. We first test for the
existence of cross-country dependence of time series. In light of the results of this test, we
apply the proper panel unit root tests to identify the non-stationary variables. As a next
step, we test for the existence of any cointegrating relationship among the non-stationary
variables. Finally, assuming the existence of a long-run cointegrating relationship, we
estimate the long-run and short-run effects.
2.B.1 Cross Section Dependence Tests
Due to the geographic proximity and the socioeconomic connections which can lead to
common shocks or spillover effects, there is a possibility that the variables are correlated
across countries. This correlation should be taken into account in the test and estimation
procedures, since it can lead to imprecise estimates or identification problems. Therefore,
as a first step in the analysis, we examine the existence of this correlation by using the
cross-sectional dependence (CD) test proposed by Pesaran (2004), which tests the null
hypothesis of independence of variables across the panel members. The test is based on an
average of all pairwise correlations of the raw variables. The CD statistic can be defined
as:
CD =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρˆij
→ N(0, 1) (2.B.1)
where ρˆij is the estimate of the pairwise correlation.
Table 2.B.1 reports the CD test statistics and the corresponding p-values for the
variables we use. According to these results, the independence hypothesis is rejected for
all of variables. Therefore, cross sectional dependence should be taken into account in the
further steps of the analysis.
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Table 2.B.1: Cross Section Dependence Tests
Variable CD-test p-value Correlation
Ln (Non-electricity consumption per capita) 4.83 0.000 0.393
Ln (Electricity consumption per capita) 35.57 0.000 0.799
Ln (Gas price) 35.21 0.000 0.791
Ln (Electricity price) 37.25 0.000 0.837
Ln (GDP) 43.21 0.000 0.971
Ln (Heating degree-days) 29.89 0.000 0.672
Ln (Cooling degree-days) 17.35 0.000 0.691
Share of population over age 65 30.55 0.000 0.454
Maximum U-value requirement for external walls 33.60 0.000 0.755
Coverage of label policy 42.16 0.003 0.947
Notes:
Under The null hypothesis of cross-section independence CD N(0,1)
2.B.2 Unit Root Tests
As a next step in the analysis, we examine whether we are dealing with non-stationary
variables in our demand model. This we test using the alternative unit root method of
Pesaran (2007), which accounts for the cross sectional dependence:
∆yit = αi + β1iyi,t−1 + β2iy¯t−1 + β3i∆y¯t−1 + it (2.B.2)
where i represents the panel member, t is the time period and y¯t−1 is the cross section
average of the lagged variable and it is the error term. The test statistic is based on the
mean of individual Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) t-statistics of each unit in the panel.
To eliminate the cross dependence, the standard ADF regressions are augmented with the
cross section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series. The null
hypothesis claims that all series are non-stationary.
Table 2.B.2 reports the panel unit root test results based on the specifications with and
without trend variable. The test statistics suggest that most of the variables, except the
heating degree days, cooling degree days and the coverage of label policy contain unit roots.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of unit root is rejected for all of the first-differenced
variables except share of elderly. Thus, we can conclude that the consumption, prices, GDP
and U-value variables are integrated of order one, which leads us to examine the existence
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of any long run equilibrium relationship between these variables.
Table 2.B.2: Panel Unit Root test (CIPS)
Raw Data First-differenced Data
Without trend With trend Without trend With trend
Variables Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value
Ln (Non-electricity cons.) -1.187 0.118 1.367 0.914 -7.878 0.000 -6.456 0.000
Ln (Electricity cons.) -1.193 0.117 0.498 0.691 -5.563 0.000 -3.706 0.000
Ln (Gas price) -0.429 0.334 2.146 0.984 -6.379 0.000 -6.033 0.000
Ln (Electricity price) 0.807 0.790 -1.126 0.130 -5.771 0.000 -4.580 0.000
Ln (GDP) -2.237 0.013 0.262 0.603 -3.977 0.003 -2.852 0.002
Ln (Heating degree-days) -3.933 0.000 -2.116 0.017 -7.025 0.000 -5.092 0.000
Ln (Cooling degree-days) -2.278 0.011 -2.499 0.006 -11.379 0.000 -9.765 0.000
Share of elderly 1.145 0.874 2.427 0.992 o.990 0.839 1.604 0.946
Maximum U-value requirement -0.981 0.163 1.703 0.956 -7.302 0.000 -6.853 0.000
Coverage of label policy -9.087 0.000 -7.876 0.000 -10.052 0.000 -8.109 0.000
Notes:
Under the null hypothesis series are I (1).
CIPS test assumes cross-section dependence is in form of a single unobserved common factor.
Number of lags included in ADF regressions is (2).
2.B.3 Cointegration Tests
After confirming that there exist unit roots in some of the series, we check whether there
is a long run equilibrium relationship between these variables. For this purpose, we benefit
from four different panel cointegration test statistics proposed by Westerlund (2007), which
are based on the test of error correction. Considering the following error correction model
where all variables are I(1),
∆yit = δidt + θi(yi,t−1 − βixi,t−1) +
pi∑
j=1
λij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γij∆xi,t−j + eit (2.B.3)
the θi determines the speed at which the system corrects back to the equilibrium relationship
(yi,t−1 − βixi,t−1)after a sudden shock. If θi < 0 , then there exist error correction which
implies that yit and xit are cointegrated; if θi = 0 , then the null hypothesis of no
cointegration for all panel members is true. The statement of the alternative hypothesis
depends on the homogeneity assumption regarding the error correction parameter θi. Two
of the proposed tests which are named as “Group-Mean Tests” assume heterogeneity of θ
while the other two, called “Panel Tests”, assume that θi is equal for all panel members.
In all of these test procedures, the cross-section dependence is accounted for by the use of
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bootstrap approach of Westerlund (2007).
After carrying out the cointegration tests for different combinations of the
non-stationary variables, we concluded that there do not exist a long run equilibrium
relationship between any group of non-stationary variables. Table 2.B.3 reports the results
of Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests for residential energy consumption and the
economic factors (GDP and energy prices). According to these results, both mean-group
test statistics Gt and Ga statistics verify the null hypothesis of no cointegration between
variables.
Table 2.B.3: Error Correction Model Panel Cointegration Tests
“Ln(Gas Cons.)& Ln(Gas Price)& Ln(GDP)” “Ln(Elec. Cons.)& Ln(Elec. Price)& Ln(GDP)”
Statistic Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value
Gt -1.321 0.201 0.580 0.333 -1.312 0.231 0.591 0.300
Ga -5.071 0.477 0.683 0.347 -3.276 1.614 0.947 0.497
Pt -4.262 -0.765 0.222 0.237 -3.526 -0.211 0.417 0.313
Pa -3.478 -0.692 0.244 0.267 -2.225 -0.193 0.577 0.310
Notes:
Bootstrapping critical values under H0: no cointegration
Number of lags included in ECM is (2).
2.B.4 Estimation Methodology and Results
Assuming that long run stable relationships between variables exist, we now employ an
error correction model of which the parameters are estimated using the Mean Group (MG)
estimator as it is developed by Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999). This estimator allows for
heterogeneous short run and long run dynamics. The error correction parameterization of
our energy demand model can be written as;
∆ln(cit) = θi [ln(ci,t−1)− β0i − β1iln(yit)− β2iln(pit)] + λ1i∆ln(yit) + λ2i∆ln(pit)
+λ3i∆ln(hddit) + λ4i∆ln(cddit) + λ5i∆dit + λ6ipolicyit + it
(2.B.4)
where θi is the error correction speed of adjustment parameter, β1i and β2i are the long run
income and price elasticities respectively.
The results that are reported in Table 2.B.4 indicate that there is not a long run
equilibrium between energy prices, income and energy consumption, as the coefficients of
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the error correction terms are positive. Assuming that these variables are cointegrated, we
find that there is a positive long run relationship between income and electricity use. The
results also imply that households respond to short run price changes in electricity. The
signs of the coefficients of policy variables are in line with the previous results although
statistically insignificant.
Table 2.B.4: “Mean Group” Estimation Results
Electricity Non-electricity
Long run Estimates
Ln(Price) 0.024 0.225
[0.125] [0.142]
Ln(GDP) 0.837** 0.239
[0.368] [0.261]
Short run Estimates
EC 0.308*** 0.383***
[0.058] [0.064]
∆ Ln( Price) -0.031* -0.019
[-0.016] [-0.036]
∆ Ln(GDP) -0.152 0.297
[0.155] [0.206]
∆ Ln(Heating Degree-days) 0.146*** 0.467***
[0.034] [0.080]
∆ Ln(Cooling Degree-days) -0.005
[0.010]
∆ Share of population over age 65 0.008 -0.019
[0.027] [0.044]
Coverage of label policy (between 0 and 1) -0.025
[0.028]
Maximum U-value Requirement for External Walls 0.086
[0.094]
Observations 348 348
Notes:
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Consumption per capita).
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Chapter 3
Energy Efficiency and Household
Behavior: The Rebound Effect in the
Residential Sector
3.1 Introduction
Energy consumption in the durable building stock has, once again, returned to the agenda
of policy makers. Around the world, regulatory measures are introduced to reduce and
mitigate the harmful effects of climate change that result, in part, from the carbon emission
externality of energy consumption in buildings. While stricter building codes seem to have
reduced the energy consumption of newly constructed dwellings (Jacobsen and Kotchen,
2013), codes as a policy instrument alone may be insufficient to meet broader energy
reduction targets for the built environment (Majcen et al., 2013). Irrespective of the
effectiveness of policies in increasing the thermal quality of the building stock, a critical
debate focuses on how households respond to these improvements in energy efficiency.
Research has shown that, as a consequence of the associated changes in consumer
behavior, technological improvements may lead to lower energy savings than expected
(Jevons, 1906; Brookes, 1990; Khazzoom, 1980, 1987; Wirl, 1997). The mechanism
underlying this behavioral change can be derived from the neoclassical economic theory. As
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described by the “household production” model of Becker (1965), households use energy
as one of the inputs in the production of services – such as driving, space heating, and
cooking. Households acquire utility from consuming energy services, rather than from
consuming energy itself. When the energy efficiency of a particular service is improved,
without leading to an offsetting change in the price of energy, households realize a reduction
in the effective price of that service due to the decrease in the amount of energy that is
required for its production. Consequently, under the condition that the demand for the
energy service is price-elastic, improved energy efficiency leads to an increase in its demand,
so the amount of energy that is required for its production. This implicit price mechanism
generates the so-called “rebound effect” as it partially offsets the initial efficiency gains.1
While the existence of such rebound effect is widely acknowledged, the real debate lies
in the identification and the size of the effect (Gillingham et al., 2013; Greening et al.,
2000). The discussion on the extent of rebound effect has led to different views on the
role of energy efficiency policies in addressing climate change (Borenstein, 2015). So far,
due to the uncertainty regarding its actual size, the rebound effect has been disregarded
in ex-ante impact assessments of energy conservation measures (e.g. building regulations
and energy efficiency subsidy programs), leading to higher expectations about their role in
saving energy (Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013). This is of importance, as it determines the
success of energy efficiency policies in reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions.
Incorporating the rebound effect into policy evaluations can help to develop cost-effective
energy conservation policies.2
Furthermore, as the size of the rebound effect may vary across different socio-economic
segments of the society, identification of the heterogeneity in the rebound effect may
1The literature identifies three types of rebound effects that encompass both the microeconomic
and macroeconomic perspectives (Greening et al., 2000; Sorrell et al., 2009): the direct rebound effect,
the indirect rebound effect and the economy-wide effects. The direct rebound effect occurs when an
improvement in energy efficiency for a particular energy service reduces the effective cost of the service,
which subsequently leads to increased consumption.The indirect rebound effect occurs when the reduction
of the effective cost of the energy service leads to changes in demand of other goods, services and
productive services that also require energy. The sum of direct and indirect rebound effects represents
the economy-wide rebound effect. In this study, we focus on direct rebound effect.
2It is important to note that, since rebound effect is a re-optimization as a response to implicit price
changes, it can be seen as welfare improving according to the neoclassical economic theory. On the other
hand, its extend has important implications on the outcomes of energy conservation policies.
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also contribute to the assessment of potential outcomes of energy efficiency policies. As
Borenstein (2015) mentions, the size of the rebound effect might be different for the
households who are targeted by energy efficiency regulations. For instance, low-income
households, who are more likely to accommodate in poorly insulated houses, might be more
responsive to the efficiency improvements as they are expected to be more cost-sensitive. In
that case, the regulations, which are specifically targeting energy-inefficient dwelling stock,
will result with a higher rebound effect than the average. Another source of heterogeneity
might be the variation in energy use intensity level of the households. Since the cost of
heating is higher for the households who are more energy dependent, these households
might show a stronger response to energy efficiency changes. Identification of household
level heterogeneity can also guide us to form policy expectations for different regions of the
world with different income and energy use intensity levels, and for the other residential
energy services that require different amounts of energy input. Thus, for policy purposes,
an important question is how rebound effect differs by income and energy use intensity.
Measuring the rebound effect is not straightforward, as it involves an estimation of the
elasticity of the demand for a particular energy service with respect to energy efficiency.
Instead of using this definition, the majority of studies on the topic have estimated the
rebound effect using price elasticity, since data on energy efficiency measurements is
generally limited. In principle, under neoclassical assumptions, rational consumers should
respond in the same way to a decrease in energy prices as they would respond to an
improvement in energy efficiency. This symmetry assumption, however, does not always
hold, as consumers may respond differently to these alternatives due to the “bounded
rationality”. While making consumption decisions, as a result of cognitive limitations and
attention scarcity, households may overweight information that is prominent (Simon, 1955;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For instance, Sexton et al. (2015) documents that, for
a sample of consumers who are enrolled in an automatic bill payment program, perceived
energy costs decline, and the electricity consumption significantly increases after the change
of payment method. The difference between the perceived persistence of price changes and
the efficiency changes might also lead to asymmetric responses. Li et al. (2014) report that
households’ response to gasoline tax changes is six times as large as that from tax-exclusive
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price changes, which might be a result of the difference in the perception of longevity of these
changes. Finally, even if the symmetry assumption is satisfied, many studies estimating
price elasticity of energy demand fail to address endogeneity concerns, as the adoption
of energy-efficient technologies itself may be affected by changes in energy prices (Sorrell
et al., 2009).3
In the literature, the transport sector and the residential sector are the two
main areas where improvements in energy efficiency have previously been studied, as
energy consumption levels are high in both sectors, and technological innovations are
fast-evolving.4 However, due to limited availability of data, the literature on the housing
market has been relatively scant. For the housing market, residential heating is of key
interest, since there are many ways in which consumer behavior may influence the level of
this energy demand, for example, by means of choosing temperature levels, share of space
heated, ventilation rates, etc.
One strand of the available literature on the topic is based upon cross-section analysis
of household survey data (Dubin et al., 1986; Hsueh and Gerner, 1993; Haas and Biermayr,
2000). Dubin et al. (1986) study the relationship between actual electricity consumed
for heating and the cost of heating for 252 single-family dwellings in Florida. Using
the variations in energy price and energy efficiency indicators, the authors report a price
elasticity of heating demand ranging from 52 to 81 percent. Similarly, Hsueh and Gerner
(1993) use data from 1,281 single-family homes in the U.S., and document that the
engineering estimates are two to eight times as large as the realized savings for different
insulation measures (roof, wall and windows), depending on region and type of fuel.
Using a cross-section database of about 500 Austrian households, Haas and Biermayr
(2000) estimate a rebound effect about 30 percent based on the variation in the thermal
characteristics of the dwellings. Although this literature provides more reliable estimates of
3Sorrell et al. (2009) also mentions that, due to the irreversibility of efficiency improvements and
regulations, energy price elasticities are found to be higher for periods with rising prices than those for
falling prices. Given that reduction in energy prices is the appropriate proxy for efficiency improvements,
studies that are based on time series data including periods of rising prices may overestimate the rebound
effect.
4See, for example, Wheaton (1982) and Small and Van Dender (2007) for the case of vehicle fuel
economy, Hausman (1979) for the case of air conditioners, Davis et al. (2014) for the case of refrigirators,
and Davis (2008) for the case of clothes washers.
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the rebound effect compared to the evidence based upon price elasticities only, it also has
some drawbacks in terms of data and methodology used in the estimations. These studies
are based on small samples which lead to imprecise (or even statistically insignificant)
estimates of the rebound effect. Besides, given the lack of detailed information on dwelling
and household characteristics, the use of cross-sectional analysis may lead to a bias arising
due to unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, since an analysis of efficiency measures require
detailed information regarding the technical characteristics of dwellings, which is not easy
to measure with survey questions, the measurement error in calculated (or self-reported)
efficiency indicators potentially leads to a bias in the estimated rebound effect.
Another methodological approach in the literature is to compare the demand for heating
before and after an energy efficiency improvement (Hirst et al., 1985; Milne and Boardman,
2000; Haas and Biermayr, 2000). For instance, Hirst et al. (1985) compares the internal
temperature settings before and after efficiency improvements for 79 U.S. households who
received subsidies. They document that 11 percent of the potential savings is not achieved
(although not statistically significant) due to the change in internal temperature. Milne
and Boardman (2000) examine the average change of internal temperature after efficiency
improvements using data from 13 UK efficiency projects, and conclude that the average
rebound effect observed in these projects is around 30 percent. Haas and Biermayr (2000)
study the gap between theoretically calculated and realized energy savings after energy
retrofit measures for 12 large multi-family dwellings in Austria. They document that the
actual savings are 40 to 100 percent less than the expected savings. However, as well as the
problems associated with the limited sample size, there are also some concerns regarding
the methodological quality of these studies. The results provided by these studies are based
upon simple before-after comparisons, without use of a control group. Since there might be
other factors which may also have affected the observed outcome (e.g. thermostat settings),
the use of simple before-after comparisons might lead to biased results (Meyer, 1995).
Besides, these studies potentially suffer from sampling bias, resulting from non-random
selection of the project participants (Hartman, 1988). Finally, the thermostat setting might
be a poor proxy for the heating demand, since it does not take the other determinants of
thermal comfort (such as the share of heated area, humidity, and airflow) into account.
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In this study, we address some of the methodological limitations in the current literature
on the identification of rebound effect. This is the first study in the literature that is
based on a large representative sample of dwellings using a continuous energy efficiency
measure. We analyze a detailed panel dataset that covers both the engineering estimations
and the actual energy consumption of 560,000 households in the Dutch housing market.
Exploiting the widespread diffusion of home energy performance certificates (EPCs), which
are mandatory in all Member states of the European Union, we investigate the elasticity of
actual energy consumption relative to the engineering predictions of energy performance. In
order to account for the potential measurement error in engineering estimates, we use an
instrumental variable approach by including the year of construction as an instrument.
Although we control for the observed household characteristics such as income, size,
employment status, gender and age, we also estimate a fixed-effects model to control for
unobserved household characteristics that might be correlated with the thermal quality of
the dwelling.
Using the large number of covariates in our dataset, we then explore the heterogeneity
of the rebound effect, which may help to better understand the findings. We separately
estimate the model for cohorts of households with different income and/or wealth levels
and differences in tenure (i.e., households that own a home versus households that rent a
place). Using a quantile regression approach, we also examine whether the magnitude of
the rebound effect depends upon the actual energy use intensity of households. Finally, as
a robustness check, we estimate the rebound effect based on a quasi-experimental design for
a subsample of dwellings that benefited from an energy efficiency subsidy program initiated
by Dutch government.
Our findings suggest that, on average, the rebound effect for residential heating is
41.3 percent for tenants and 26.7 percent for the homeowners. We document that the
rebound effect is strongest among lower income groups – these households are further from
their satiation in consumption of energy services, including thermal comfort (Milne and
Boardman, 2000). Based on the results of quantile regression analysis, we also report that
the rebound effect is larger among consumers with relatively high energy consumption. For
the dwellings that benefited from an energy efficiency subsidy program, we show that the
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efficiency improvements lead to a rebound effect of around 55 percent. The relative large
size of this estimated rebound effect for these households supports our findings, as well
as the heterogeneity hypothesis. Households that invest in the efficiency improvements
are at the upper quantiles of the actual gas consumption distribution in the population.
Clearly, income and usage patterns are key aspects to take into account in the design and
implementation of energy efficiency policies.
The results of this paper have some implications for policy makers. There is much
excitement about the potential for energy savings, and thus reductions of carbon emissions,
from the residential and commercial building sectors. Some estimates indicate that it is
the built environment where such savings come at a financial return rather than just a
capital cost (Enkvist et al., 2007). But in the current debate on energy efficiency, program
evaluations on for example the effects of subsidies and rebates are often based on engineering
calculations of energy savings. While the behavioral response of consumers through a
rebound effect should be ”no excuse for inaction” (Gillingham et al., 2013), it needs to
be incorporated in models of projected energy savings through energy efficiency measures
that governments and public policy outfits often use. Using these adjusted, more realistic
models may increase the effectiveness of policies regarding energy efficiency measures. This
holds for governments in EU Member States when it comes to, for example, the deployment
of mandatory disclosure schemes through Energy Performance Certificates, but also more
generally for countries outside the European Union when designing (incentive) programs
for improving energy efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
engineering models used to predict residential energy efficiency. Section 3 describes the
data, and provides some descriptive statistics. In section 4, we present the methodology
and the results. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
3.2 Energy Labels and Consumption Predictions
Mandated by EU regulation, all leasing and sales transactions in the housing market of
every EU Member State need to be accompanied by an energy performance certificate
46
(EPC). Based on an energy index, the energy performance certificates range from “A++”
for exceptionally energy-efficient dwellings, to “G” for highly inefficient buildings. The
energy index measures the energy efficiency level, based on thermal characteristics of
the building. Professionally trained and certified assessors issue the certificates using
standardized software. In order to classify the dwelling into one of the energy classes;
an engineer visits a dwelling and inspects its physical characteristics (e.g., size, quality of
insulation, type of windows, etc.). The collected information is then used to predict the
total energy consumption of the dwelling.5 After scaling by the size and the heating loss
area of the dwelling, the prediction is transformed into an energy index, which corresponds
to a certain label class, and this information is reported to a government managed database.
Once the information has been verified, the certificate is registered and issued to the
seller. Appendix 3.A provides a stylized example of the energy label in the Netherlands,
which is comparable across the EU. Obtaining the certificate requires an investment of
approximately e200, which is incurred by the seller of the dwelling. Dwellings that have
been constructed after 1999, or that are classified as monuments, are exempted from
mandatory disclosure of the energy performance certificate.6
In this study, we use predicted gas consumption, which is provided by EPC, as a measure
of thermal efficiency. In Appendix 3.B, we briefly describe the framework of the engineering
model that is used to predict the amount of residential gas that is required to achieve a
fixed level of thermal comfort.7 As mentioned by Pe´rez-Lombard et al. (2009), these “asset
rating” engineering models are based on standard usage patterns, standard set of operating
parameters (e.g., for thermostat settings) and climatic conditions that do not depend on
occupant behavior, actual weather and indoor conditions, and are developed to rate the
5The predicted total energy consumption based on the EPC is a combination of predicted gas and
electricity consumption. However, the electricity component does not include the electricity consumption
from household appliances, which are expected to make up nearly 40 percent of total residential electricity
consumption (Majcen et al., 2013). Therefore, since the predicted electricity consumption is not comparable
with actual electricity use, we focus on residential heating only.
6Importantly, if the buyer of the dwelling signs a waiver, the seller is also exempt from providing the
certificate. The sell-side real estate agent typically offers such a waiver.
7The engineering model and software tool that are used in the calculations comply with “BRL 9501”
describing the quality of the calculation method according to ISSO-publication 54 “Energy Diagnosis
Reference (EDR)”. EDR describes the test procedures (case studies etc.) that need to be carried out to
check the validity of the calculations, and it serves as a guarantee of quality for the tested application.
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building and not the occupant. Use of asset rating model enables us to compare different
houses using a consistent methodology (SENTECH, Inc., 2010). For instance, these models
assume that the occupants heat the complete usable floor area of the dwelling at a fixed
level of temperature. This assumption may seem unrealistic, since occupants can opt to
heat only some of the rooms (because of the higher cost of heating the complete space).
However, in the context of our model, this assumption is acceptable and even required, as
we estimate the response of the occupants to the changing cost of thermal comfort. So,
if the occupant prefers to heat only part of the dwelling, we interpret this as a behavioral
response to the higher cost of heating the complete space. Therefore, we do not consider
these standard assumptions to represent a source of systematic measurement error in the
predicted energy efficiency; instead, these assumptions are necessary in order to obtain a
correct measure of energy efficiency.
In the engineering literature, there are also some studies examining whether engineering
predictions of energy consumption fit with the actual energy consumption. For
example, comparing the predictions of different engineering models with the utility bills,
Edwards et al. (2013) report that engineering models over-predict the average actual
gas consumption. However, since average actual gas consumption is also determined by
average occupant behavior which is preferably not included in the asset rating models, this
comparison do not provide any evidence for a systematic mistake in the energy efficiency
rating models.8 In this study, we benefit from this occupant-independent characteristic of
gas use predictions. In order to identify the rebound effect, instead of investigating the
gap between average predicted and actual gas use, we focus on the gap between relative
changes in these variables. Thus, what is of importance for this study is the systematic
accuracy of the asset rating model.
The accuracy of asset rating models is typically based upon evaluations of tools against
accepted baseline standards. National Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy
has developed a number of building energy simulation test (BESTEST) instruments for
8It should be noted that the standard occupant behavior and standard set of operating parameters are
not determined based on average behaviour observed in the population. They are chosen based on a set of
conditions that satisfy a sufficient level of thermal comfort.
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assessment and identification of errors in engineering software that is used for analysis
of energy efficiency in building sector (Judkoff et al., 2011).9 Given the fact that the
engineering model that is used in the calculation procedure is examined through energy
simulation tests (Judkoff and Neymark, 1995; Neymark and Judkoff, 2004) and verified by
pilot studies in each EU country which are implementing a similar labeling policy (Poel
et al., 2007), we assume that there is not a systematic measurement error that is related
to the engineering model.
On the other side, although the predicted energy efficiency is based on an advanced
engineering model using detailed information on thermal characteristics of the dwelling, it
is still based on some assumptions regarding some characteristics of the dwelling, which are
not easy to observe. Especially for older dwellings, the inspector has to make assumptions
regarding the thermal quality (U-value) of building envelope and the rates of ventilation
and infiltration. Besides that, the installation quality of insulation might be lower than
expected because of the moral hazard problem. However, Maldonado (2013) reports that
when analyzing the housing stock in the Netherlands, 184 reference buildings were used to
verify the assumptions made on the components of buildings. These reference dwellings
are used to determine the energy saving potential of dwellings’ technical installations.
Furthermore, a sample of reference houses were used the check the validity for packages
(combinations of thermal envelope and technical systems improvements) of energy saving
measures. Therefore, while we acknowledge the presence of measurement error through
engineering assumptions, we do not expect this to be significantly correlated with the
degree of efficiency of a dwelling.
The other potential source of measurement error is the quality of the inspection. In
2011, it was documented that 16.7 percent of the labeled dwellings exceeded the maximum
acceptable level of the deviation from the real energy index (VROM-Inspectie, 2011). These
9There is also a discussion on the effectiveness of these instruments (SENTECH, Inc., 2010). However,
the debate stems from the observed differences between predicted and realized energy consumption levels,
which might be explained by the behavioral factors that are preferably not included in the asset rating
models. For instance, Hendron et al. (2003) suggest incorporating a set of operational assumptions that
mimic realistic occupant behavior into engineering models. As this example represents, most of the
discussion relates to the accuracy of the models in predicting realized energy consumption, which is not
the main objective of the asset rating models.
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labels, which deviate from the real energy index more than eight percent, are considered
as labels with a critical defect. However, examination of the data on re-inspection of
a sample of labeled dwellings indicates that this inspection error is not systematically
and significantly correlated with the true efficiency value. By using the data on 47
re-inspections, provided by VROM-Inspectie (2011), we found that there is not a significant
relationship between the true energy index and the inspection error.10
3.3 Data
AgencyNL, a government agency, maintains a repository with information on the
characteristics of the certified dwellings as well as their predicted gas consumption. We
merge the dwelling information with information on occupant characteristics and their
actual gas consumption, provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS).
This leads to a panel of 610,000 dwellings and their occupants, which adopted an Energy
Performance Certificate (EPC) in the years 2011 and 2012. Additionally, in order to assess
whether there are significant differences between the characteristics of the dwellings with
and without label, we also use a sample of 122,119 dwellings that are not labeled. These
are the dwellings that were sold in years 2011 and 2012, and registered by the National
Association of Realtors (NVM). The final dataset includes information on the dwelling
characteristics, household characteristics and the household’s annual gas consumption from
2008 to 2011.
We exclude the years in which occupants change their address, since it is not possible
to exactly identify the amount of energy used by the occupant in that year. We also drop
the observations with a gas or electricity consumption of zero, and we exclude outliers that
are detected based on the sample distribution of house size, actual and predicted energy
consumption (electricity and gas) – the upper and lower boundaries for the outliers are
set at the first and 99th percentile. The complete dataset includes an unbalanced panel of
563,010 dwellings.
According to CBS statistics, 59.3 percent of the housing stock consisted of
10The estimated correlation coefficient is equal to 0.105 with a p-value 0.482.
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owner-occupied dwellings in 2011. However, since the diffusion of energy labels among
owner-occupied dwellings in the Netherlands is relatively slow, the share of owner-occupied
dwellings in our sample is only around eight percent, which is below the population average.
Therefore, the rental housing stock is overrepresented in our sample. Since this might
cause a sampling bias in the estimation of the average rebound effect, we analyze the
owner-occupied and rental sample separately.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for dwelling and household characteristics.
The sample statistics indicate that there are only few differences in the average
characteristics of the two samples (rental versus owner-occupied dwellings). The gas
consumption in the owner-occupied market seems to exceed the consumption in the rental
market, but once correcting for the variation in dwelling size, the differences disappear. For
both the rental and owner-occupied homes in our sample, we find that gas consumption
predictions that are based on the labels are higher than the actual gas bills.11 This difference
is 17 percent for the rental dwellings, and about 16 percent for the owner-occupied dwellings.
Regarding the distribution of energy label categories, we find almost no difference between
the subsamples. The other variables indicate that there is overrepresentation of apartments
in our rental sample, that rental homes are typically more recently constructed, are smaller
in size and accommodate households that are more often elderly with lower income and
wealth. We also compare the labeled owner-occupied dwellings with the owner-occupied
dwellings that are not labeled. The average actual gas consumption and the occupant
characteristics are quite similar for both samples. However, the non-labeled sample contains
more dwellings that are built after the year 2000. This is in line with expectations, as the
energy label is not mandatory for the dwellings constructed after 1999.
11Since the predicted gas use is calculated based on a fixed number of heating degree days (212 days with
an average outside temperature equal to 5.64 degree Celsius), in order to provide comparable descriptive
statistics, the actual gas consumption in each year is corrected for the annual heating degree days (HDD)
in that year. We multiply the actual gas consumption of the household by the ratio of the “fixed HDD”
to the “actual HDD” of that year. Fixed HDD, which is used in engineering predictions, is equal to
212 ∗ (18 − 5.64) = 1, 620. We apply this correction in order to better evaluate the average gap between
engineering predictions and realized consumption in Table 3.1. In the analysis, we do not apply this
correction as we include year and location dummies in our model, which control for varying climatic
conditions.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Rental Owner-Occupied Owner-Occupied
(With Label) (With Label) (Without Label)
Number of Observations 519,512 43,498 122,119
Variables Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Actual Gas Consumption (m3) 1,245 (526) 1,588 (665) 1,573 (632)
Predicted Gas Consumption (m3) 1,492 (624) 1,887 (759)
Actual Gas Consumption (m3/m2) 15.7 (7.1) 15.3 (6.2)
Predicted Gas Consumption (m3/m2) 18.7 (8.1) 18.2 (7.1)
Size (m2) 82.2 (21.6) 106.7 (34.7)
Label:
Label-A (EI<1.06) 0.02 0.03
Label-B (1.05<EI<1.31) 0.16 0.17
Label-C (1.30<EI<1.61) 0.33 0.32
Label-D (1.60<EI<2.01) 0.25 0.24
Label-E (2.00<EI<2.41) 0.14 0.14
Label-F (2.40<EI<2.91) 0.07 0.08
Label-G (2.90<EI) 0.03 0.02
Dwelling Type:
Apartment 0.49 0.27 0.21
Semi-detached 0.32 0.21 0.32
Corner 0.19 0.32 0.32
Detached 0.00 0.20 0.15
Construction Period:
1900-1929 0.07 0.10 0.12
1930-1944 0.03 0.08 0.09
1945-1959 0.17 0.14 0.08
1960-1969 0.20 0.19 0.15
1970-1979 0.19 0.25 0.17
1980-1989 0.20 0.12 0.14
1990-1999 0.11 0.09 0.16
>2000 0.03 0.03 0.09
Household Characteristics:
Number of Household Members 1.91 (1.12) 2.36 (1.21) 2.28 (1.21)
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.46 (0.68) 0.29 (0.62) 0.31 (0.61)
Number of Children (<18) 0.34 (0.78) 0.50 (0.89) 0.53 (0.91)
Number of Females in Household 1.01 (0.74) 1.16 (0.77) 1.13 (0.79)
Number of Working Household Members 0.84 (0.94) 1.48 (0.99) 1.35 (0.96)
Household Annual Net Income (1000 Euro) 23.8 (11.5) 36.9 (17.1) 37.3 (26.2)
Household Wealth (1000 Euro) 22.6 (91.6) 177.8 (393.8) 191.3 (531.5)
Share of Households Receiving Rent Subsidy 0.41
Notes:
The sample of labeled dwellings consists of the dwellings that have adopted an EPC in 2011 or 2012. The sample of
dwellings without a label includes dwellings that have been sold in years 2011 and 2012. Since the label categories “A+”
and “A++” have a small share in the full sample, we merged these categories with label “A”.
The statistics on actual gas consumption and household characteristics are calculated based on both the cross-sectional
and the time-series variation (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) in the sample.
“Apartment” category is a combination of four different apartment types which are reported in the AgentschapNL data.
Figure 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of actual versus predicted energy consumption
across label categories, in cubic meters per unit of floor area, measured in square meters.
The figure also includes the 95-percent confidence interval. On average, gas consumption
predictions correspond quite precisely with the label categorization. Of course, this is a
result by design, as these predictions determine the categorization. When comparing the
52
descriptives with the box-plots that represent actual gas consumption, we observe a similar
trend, but also clear deviations in the tails. The predictions of consumption are lower than
the realized gas consumption for efficient dwellings and the reverse is true for inefficient
dwellings. Moreover, we also observe that the variation in actual gas consumption is much
larger than for the predictions. The higher variation in actual gas consumption may be
explained by behavioral factors, such as time at home, comfort preferences, etc., that are
not included in the engineering predictions.
Figure 3.1: Predicted versus Actual Gas consumption
Source: Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS), AgentschapNL, authors’ calculations
We also stratify the sample across dwelling types, to assess whether the deviations
between predicted and actual consumption are common across dwellings or whether they
are type-specific. Comparing the statistics plotted in Figure 3.2, we document quite
similar patterns. The dwelling type cannot explain why actual gas consumption is so
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different from what would be expected from the label. For all different dwelling types
(apartments, semi-detached dwelling, corner dwelling and detached dwellings), we find
underestimations of gas consumption for energy-efficient dwellings, and overestimations for
inefficient dwellings.
Figure 3.2: Predicted versus Realized Gas consumption by Dwelling Type
Source: Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS), AgentschapNL, authors’ calculations
In Figure 3.3, we plot the relationship between the predicted gas consumption and the
ratio of actual versus predicted gas consumption. Here, we can consider the “predicted gas
consumption” as the cost of heating the whole area of the dwelling at a fixed temperature,
and the “actual/predicted” ratio can be considered as an indicator of the household demand
for heating. The graph shows that as the cost of heating decreases (efficiency increases),
the “actual/predicted” ratio increases, which provides some support for the rebound effect
hypothesis. Moreover, the deviations between predicted and realized gas consumption are
larger for tenants. This difference may be explained by the income and wealth differences
between the two subsamples, as we expect the households with lower income and wealth
levels to be more sensitive to cost changes from energy efficiency.
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Figure 3.3: Realized/Predicted Gas Consumption
Source: Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS), AgentschapNL, authors’ calculations
Finally, we compare the most energy-efficient and inefficient houses, and their residents
based on their observable characteristics. Table 3.2 documents the descriptive statistics
for the houses that are at the lower (below 10th) and upper (above 90th) quantiles
of the energy index distribution, which represent the energy-efficient and inefficient
houses respectively. The statistics indicate that the percentage difference in actual gas
consumption between these samples is significantly smaller than the percentage difference
in their predicted gas consumption. Considering the other house characteristics, we observe
that, as a main determinant of energy efficiency, the distribution of year of construction
is significantly different between energy-efficient and inefficient houses. Examining the
household characteristics, we do not observe significant differences between the households
who are residing in these houses. On the other hand, we should note that the households
who are accommodating in energy-efficient houses are wealthier compared to the households
in energy-inefficient houses, although not statistically significant.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Energy-efficient and Inefficient Houses
Rental Owner-occupied
Efficient Inefficient Efficient Inefficient
(EI<1.2) (EI>2.3) (EI<1.2) (EI>2.3)
Number of Observations 59,595 53,502 4,381 4,713
Actual Gas Consumption (m3) 1,046 1,396 1,391 1,546
(499) (567) (688) (601)
Predicted Gas Consumption (m3) 873 2,513 1,240 2,598
(249) (639) (538) (771)
Actual Gas Consumption (m3/m2) 12.9 19.1 12.3 18.2
(6.3) (7.9) (6.0) (7.1)
Predicted Gas Consumption (m3/m2) 10.7 34.3 10.6 30.8
(2.8) (8.0) (2.9) (8.3)
Size (m2) 84.0 75.2 117.4 87.5
(22.6) (18.8) (40.3) (25.6)
Dwelling Type:
Apartment 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.48
Semi-detached 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.20
Corner 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.27
Detached 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.05
Construction Period:
1900-1929 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.15
1930-1944 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.14
1945-1959 0.06 0.39 0.08 0.26
1960-1969 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.21
1970-1979 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.23
1980-1989 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.01
1990-1999 0.31 0.00 0.19 0.00
>2000 0.28 0.00 0.35 0.00
Household Characteristics:
Number of Household Members 1.80 1.92 2.36 2.04
(1.04) (1.14) (1.23) (1.12)
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.55 0.44 0.33 0.32
(0.55) (0.68) (0.65) (0.62)
Number of Children (<18) 0.29 0.35 0.53 0.33
(0.72) (0.80) (0.93) (0.73)
Number of Females in Household 0.99 1.00 1.16 1.02
(0.69) (0.76) (0.77) (0.71)
Number of Working Household Members 0.75 0.82 1.43 1.30
(0.88) (0.90) (1.00) (0.93)
Household Annual Net Income (1000 Euro) 23.7 23.0 38.0 32.9
(11.0) (11.1) (18.1) (16.4)
Household Wealth (1000 Euro) 30.3 20.4 220.3 135.7
(110.9) (69.6) (310.1) (120.5)
Share of Households Receiving Rent Subsidy 0.40 0.38
Notes:
Energy-efficient and inefficient houses are selected based on the distribution of energy index (EI). Energy-efficient houses
are the houses having an energy index lower than the 10th quantile of the distribution (EI<1.2), and energy-inefficient
houses are the houses with an energy index higher than the 90th quantile of the distribution (EI>2.3).
The statistics on actual gas consumption and household characteristics are calculated based on both the cross-sectional
and the time-series variation (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) in the sample.
“Apartment” category is a combination of four different apartment types which are reported in the AgentschapNL data.
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3.4 Methodology and Results
The rebound effect can be described as the elasticity of demand for a particular energy
service with respect to energy efficiency. In this paper, the energy service is represented by
the “thermal comfort” (heating), which is a combination of occupant’s preferences regarding
the temperature level, the share of heated space, the heating duration, and the shower
duration. Thus, we can define the rebound effect for residential heating as:
τG = ∂ln(H)/∂ln(µH) (3.4.1)
where H denotes the residential heating that is consumed by households (the temperature
level, percentage of the heated space and heating duration, quantity of hot water used per
person in a day) and µH is the heating efficiency of the dwelling (heating system, dwelling
characteristics, size, etc.) The heating efficiency can be defined as the heating level that
can be achieved with one m3 of gas:
µH = Hr/G∗ (3.4.2)
In equation (3.4.2), Hr is the reference heating level that is taken as fixed in the
calculation of the EPC and G∗ is the amount of gas that is required in order to reach
that heating level. This reference heating level can be described by: indoor temperature
fixed at 18 degree Celsius for the complete space of the dwelling during the heating season
(212 days), and a fixed amount of hot water per person per day. Assuming there is
one-to-one relationship between the actual gas consumption and the actual residential
heating consumption, we can define the actual level of heating that is consumed by
households as follows:
H = Hr(Ga/G∗) (3.4.3)
where Ga denotes the actual gas consumption. By using Equations (3.4.2) and (3.4.3), the
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rebound effect (3.4.1) can be redefined as:
τG = ∂ln[Hr(Ga/G∗)]/∂ln[Hr/G∗] (3.4.4)
Since Hr is fixed in the above equation, the rebound effect is equal to:
τG = 1− ∂ln(Ga)/∂ln(G∗) (3.4.5)
which describes the relationship between actual and theoretical gas use.
3.4.1 Empirical Results
In order to identify the rebound effect in residential heating demand, we estimate the
relationship between actual and theoretical gas use by applying a set of different estimation
methods. The standard econometric model used to estimate this relationship can be defined
as:
ln(Gait) = β0 + β1ln(G
p
it) +
j∑
j=2
βjZjit + αi + εit (3.4.6)
where i is the household identifier, t is year, and Gp is the predicted gas consumption, which
is used as the measure of theoretical gas use (G∗). Z is a vector of observed control variables
that are not included in the calculation of EPC, but that are affecting the household’s gas
consumption, such as household size and composition, province, year, income, employment
status of the household members, and ownership of the house. The composite error term
is a combination of αi which denotes the unobserved household-specific effects and the
independent and normally distributed error term; εit. The coefficient of interest is:
β1 = ∂ln(Ga)/∂ln(Gp) (3.4.7)
which is used to estimate the rebound effect formulated in equation (3.4.5):
τG = 1− β1 (3.4.8)
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We first estimate this model using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), assuming that
Gpit is independent of (αi + εit). The results of these estimations are presented in Table
3.3. When explaining actual gas consumption by the predicted gas consumption and the
province and year fixed effects (column 1), the explanatory power of our model is about 21
percent of the variation in the residential gas use of the rental dwellings. The explanatory
power of the model for the owner-occupied dwellings is 36 percent. The explanatory power
increases to 25 and 40 percent, respectively, when we include the household characteristics.
The signs and magnitudes of the estimated effects for our control variables are in line
with expectations. We find that, as the household size increases by one person, there is an
increase in residential gas consumption by about 10 percent, with a decreasing marginal
effect in larger households. In line with the findings of Brounen et al. (2012), demographics
such as the number of elderly people and the number of females in the household also
have a positive effect on residential gas consumption. We also control for the employment
status of the household members. By including a dummy variable that indicates whether
all household members are working or not, we aim to control for the time spent at home.
The estimated coefficient indicates that if all household members are working, the gas
consumption of that household decreases by six percent in rental units and by four percent
in owner-occupied dwellings.
The income elasticity of residential gas consumption is about five percent for tenants
and eight percent for homeowners. This is comparable to results obtained by Meier and
Rehdanz (2010). Analyzing a sample of UK households, the authors document an income
elasticity of residential heating of three percent for tenants and four percent for homeowners.
In line with this income effect, for the rental sample we also document that receiving a rent
subsidy (which is only available for the lowest income groups) is also related to lower gas
consumption.
Importantly, β1 ranges between 0.441 and 0.589, depending on the model specification
and the ownership status. In columns (3) and (4), we control for household characteristics,
leading to a decrease in the estimated coefficient. These estimates indicate a quite
sizable difference between relative changes in actual energy consumption and engineering
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predictions.12 We interpret this as evidence on the influence of household behavior on
residential energy consumption.
Table 3.3: Pooled OLS Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rental Owner- Rental Owner-
Occupied Occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.485*** 0.589*** 0.441*** 0.528***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Number of Household Members 0.118*** 0.132***
[0.003] [0.008]
Number of Household Members2 -0.012*** -0.014***
[0.000] [0.001]
Number of Children (<18) -0.009*** 0.001
[0.001] [0.003]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.031*** 0.049***
[0.002] [0.005]
Number of Female 0.037*** 0.016***
[0.001] [0.002]
All Household Members Are Working (1=yes) -0.060*** -0.042***
[0.002] [0.004]
Log (Household Income) 0.054*** 0.075***
[0.003] [0.007]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.032***
[0.002]
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.725*** 3.038*** 3.295*** 2.481***
[0.080] [0.083] [0.058] [0.089]
R2 0.210 0.361 0.255 0.402
Number of observations 1,664,113 87,282 1,664,113 87,282
Number of dwellings 519,512 43,498 519,512 43,498
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
12In order to check whether this gap is mainly driven by a systematic error that is related to the
unobserved characteristics of the older houses, we also estimate our model for a restricted sample including
the houses that are constructed after 1999. The estimates of β1, which are provided in Appendix
Table 3.C.1, are slightly larger compared to the full sample estimates, which might be associated to the
heterogeneity of the rebound effect. We examine the heterogeneity issue in more detail in the further
sections of the paper.
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3.4.2 Measurement Error in Engineering Predictions
Although we use a large representative sample and control for the household characteristics
in the OLS estimations, there is a potential for bias in the estimated rebound effect, which
originates from the measurement error in engineering predictions. As a next step, we
therefore explicitly take this measurement error into account.
The assumption that Gpit is independent of the error term may not be valid, due to the
potential error in engineering predictions. It can be expected that the engineering prediction
includes a measurement error, because of the assumptions made in the calculation
procedure, and the potential mistakes made during the inspection. Therefore, we assume
that the predicted theoretical gas use (Gp) is a combination of the true value (G∗) and a
random multiplicative error component (e) as shown below:
Gp = G∗e (3.4.9)
As discussed previously, the allowable inspection error is described by percentage values
(8 percent) by the engineers, which means that the inspection error is expected to be
multiplicative (proportional). We also assume that the error is not correlated with the true
theoretical gas consumption level.
The presence of this random measurement error leads to a downward bias in the OLS
estimate of β1. In order to overcome this bias, a common approach is to use an instrumental
variable (IV) method. Such an IV needs to be correlated with the predicted gas use
(Gp), but has to be independent of the measurement error (e). In our case, the year of
construction (T ) can be considered as an instrument satisfying both of these conditions.
We assume that there is a significant correlation between predicted gas consumption and
construction year. This assumption relies on the improvements in the quality of building
materials and introduction of stricter building codes. Besides, we can expect that the
mean measurement error does not depend on the year of construction, unless there is a
systematic mistake in the prediction model. If these assumptions are satisfied, we are able
to disentangle the true variation in theoretical gas use (G∗).
We estimate the model in equation (3.4.6) using two-stage least squares (2SLS)
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estimation approach, with year of construction (specified as dummy variables) as an
instrument for theoretical gas consumption. Table 3.4 reports the results of the IV
estimations.13 Compared to OLS estimates that are provided in Table 3.3, we now
document β1 estimates of 0.587 and 0.733 for the rental and owner-occupied samples,
respectively.14 While the coefficients of control variables all remain comparable in sign
and size, the use of IV estimators significantly reduces the rebound effect estimates, to 41.3
percent and 26.7 percent for the rental and owner-occupied samples, respectively. According
to these results, if the efficiency of an average dwelling is increased by 100 percent, this
will lead to a 59 percent energy saving in rental dwellings and 73 percent energy saving in
owner-occupied dwellings, ceteris paribus. The difference between the estimated rebound
effects for rental and owner-occupied dwellings is also in line with expectations that more
wealthy households are less sensitive to changes in the cost of thermal comfort. Madlener
and Hauertmann (2011) analyze the price elasticity of the residential heating for tenants
and homeowners and find similar results for German households. In the following sections,
we further analyze the heterogeneity of the rebound effect based on the wealth and income
levels.
13When we estimate the first stage model by using the the year of construction as the only explanatory
variable (specified as dummy variables), the estimated R2 is 0.225 for the rental houses and 0.256 for the
owner-occupied houses. This implies that our instrument satisfies the relevance assumption. The total R2
for the first stage model (including the other control variables) is 0.323 for the rental houses, and 0.378 for
the owner-occupied houses.
14Including the houses that are constructed before 1900 in the analysis leads to comparable results. We
estimate the same IV model by grouping these houses in one age category in our IV estimations. The total
share of these houses in our sample is nearly 0.26 percent. The estimated coefficient becomes 0.597 for
rental houses and 0.743 for owner-occupied houses. The results are not significantly different compared to
the estimates that are based on the restricted sample
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Table 3.4: Pooled OLS-Instrumental Variable Estimations
(1) (2)
Rental Owner-
Occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.587*** 0.733***
[0.012] [0.016]
Number of Household Members 0.093*** 0.105***
[0.004] [0.009]
Number of Household Members2 -0.010*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.001]
Number of Children (<18) -0.004*** 0.001
[0.001] [0.003]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.034*** 0.043***
[0.002] [0.004]
Number of Female 0.037*** 0.015***
[0.001] [0.002]
All Household Members Are Working (1=yes) -0.056*** -0.038***
[0.002] [0.004]
Log (Household income) 0.052*** 0.051***
[0.002] [0.006]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.034***
[0.002]
Province Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Constant 2.276*** 1.208***
[0.078] [0.130]
R2 0.239 0.375
R2 (First stage regression) 0.225 0.256
First-stage F-statistic on the excluded IVs 34123 1191
Number of observations 1,664,113 87,282
Number of dwellings 519,512 43,498
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
In order to test the robustness of our IV results, we also estimate the 2SLS model
based on an alternative instrument – the stringency of the building codes at the time
of construction. Starting in 1965, the Dutch government introduced minimum legal
requirements for the thermal efficiency level of new constructions. These legislations set
a maximum allowable U-value for each component (walls, windows, floor and roof) of the
constructions. U-value is defined as a measure of heat loss through one square meter of the
63
material for one-degree difference in temperature at the either side of the material. The
maximum allowable U-value for external walls decreased over-time from 2.00 W/m2 to 0.25
W/m2 by the regulations that were introduced in 1965, 1974, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1995,
2000, 2002, and 2006. Using this variation in the legal U-value requirement for external
walls as an instrument for the predicted gas consumption, we estimate the IV model.15
The results provided in Appendix Table 3.C.2 are comparable to the IV results that are
estimated using the year of construction as an instrument.
Finally, we check whether our results are robust to inclusion of house size as a control
variable. Households might respond the changing cost of thermal comfort through different
mechanisms. One potential response might be changing the share of heated area. In order
test whether our results are mainly driven by this kind of behavioral response, we control
for the size of the house in the estimations. This also enables us to test the robustness of
our findings regarding the engineering assumptions on the size of heating area. In Appendix
Table 3.C.3, we report the estimation results for the models including the size of the house
as a control variable (both linear and quadratic specifications). The results indicate that,
keeping the house size constant, the estimated rebound effect is not significantly different
than the results provided in Table 3.4. This implies that the estimated average rebound
effect is not driven by the engineering assumptions on the size of heated space.
3.4.3 Endogeneity
Another econometric issue that may cause a biased estimate is the potential presence of
household-specific factors that affect both the actual gas consumption and thermal quality
of the dwelling. One reason for this potential correlation is that energy-efficient households
sort into energy-efficient dwellings. This sorting may lead to an overestimation of β1, and
thus an underestimation of the rebound effect. On the other hand, low-wealth households
might be sorting into more affordable housing, that has a lower thermal quality and is thus
less efficient (this is sometimes referred to as “energy poverty”). In this case, there will
be a downward bias in the estimation of β1. Thus, our estimate will be biased if there
15Based on the statistics provided by AgentschapNL, we assume that the average U-value for the external
walls of the houses constructed before 1965 is equal to 2.5 W/m2.
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exists any correlation between the theoretical gas use and unobserved household-specific
factors. In order to account for this correlation, we use a fixed-effects instrumental variable
(FE-IV) estimator, benefiting from the panel structure of our dataset. By tracking the
same households over time, we are able to identify their movements from one address to
another. The address change generates a variation in theoretical gas consumption due to
the change of the characteristics of the dwelling in which the household resides. So, we
can observe the change in the energy efficiency of the dwelling, and the resulting change
in actual gas consumption, keeping the characteristics of the household fixed. By using a
FE estimator, we are able to eliminate any unobserved household-specific effects (αi) that
are correlated with the thermal quality of the house. This allows us to obtain consistent
estimates of β1 under the presence of a relationship between household-specific effects and
the thermal efficiency of the dwelling.
According to the FE estimation results, in Table 5, the rebound effect for rental
dwellings is nearly the same as the pooled OLS estimates.16 The rebound effect for
homeowners is higher as compared to the OLS estimations. However, the standard error of
this point estimate is relatively large due to the limited number of homeowners who have
changed their addresses. This leads to a larger confidence interval for the estimated rebound
effect for homeowners. When we test the differences between OLS and FE estimates,
we conclude that there is no systematic difference between these estimates, according to
Hausman test statistics. We also estimate a random-effects model, assuming that the
household-specific effects are randomly distributed and are independent of the theoretical
gas consumption. In Appendix Table C.4, the results show that the RE estimates of the
rebound effect are quite comparable to the pooled OLS results.
16When we restrict the sample of fixed-effects estimation to those households that changed their address
(i.e., moved) during the sample period (12,919 tenants and 475 homeowners), the estimated effect (0.586
for tenants and 0.658 for homeowners) is found to be very close to the fixed-effects estimate based on the
unrestricted sample.
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Table 3.5: Fixed-Effects (IV) Estimations
Rental Owner-
occupied occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.584*** 0.663***
[0.011] [0.051]
All Household Members Are Working(1=yes) 0.000 0.004
[0.001] [0.006]
Log (Household income) 0.001 0.008
[0.002] [0.007]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) 0.001
[0.001]
Province Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Constant 3.961*** 2.138***
[0.110] [0.423]
R2 0.165 0.243
R2 (within) 0.024 0.021
R2 (between) 0.176 0.249
Number of observations 994,804 44,876
Number of households 351,462 21,595
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”
We exclude the households that had a change in their composition between 2008 and 2011.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
3.4.4 Heterogeneous Effects
Another important issue regarding the identification of the rebound effect relates to the
heterogeneity of the effect within the population. As shown by the results, the rebound
effect differs by tenure – households that rent are more prone to behavioral changes than
homeowners. In this section, we further analyze the effects of wealth and income on the
magnitude of the rebound effect. The literature on price elasticity of energy indicates that
the price elasticity parameter strongly depends on the socio-economic characteristics of the
consumers (Madlener and Hauertmann, 2011; Ida et al., 2013). We expect that wealthier
households are less sensitive to cost changes, and the rebound effect may thus be lower
for these households. Besides, it can be expected that these households already maximize
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their comfort from residential heating. So, the utility that can be gained from heating
the dwelling above a comfortable room temperature will be lower. In order to test for
the impact of wealth on the rebound effect, we estimate our model separately for different
wealth cohorts, and analyze whether there is a significant difference between the estimated
rebound effects.
In Panel A of Table 3.6, we provide the results for different wealth cohorts among
homeowners. We divide the sample into quantiles, based on the position of each household
in the wealth distribution. The results show that as household becomes richer, the estimated
rebound effect decreases. The rebound effect for the lowest quantile is nearly 40 percent,
while it is “just” 19 percent for the upper quantile.17
We also analyze the heterogeneity of the rebound effect among tenants with different
income levels. We classify the households in rental units according to their income level,
since there is limited variation in the wealth levels of tenants. The results provided in Panel
B of Table 3.6 indicate that the rebound effect is heterogeneous among different income
groups. For the lowest quantile, the rebound effect is nearly 49 percent, while it is in the
range of 38-40 percent for the upper quantiles. These results imply that wealth and income
matter for the behavioral response of homeowners and tenants to the energy efficiency of
a dwelling.
17Note that the average rebound effect for the homeowners in the lowest quantile is nearly the same as
the estimated rebound effect for the average household living in a rental dwelling.
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Table 3.6: Pooled OLS-IV Estimations for Wealth and Income Cohorts
Panel A: Wealth Cohorts (Owners)
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Wealth Interval (e1000) (< 10) (10 − 69) (69 − 171) (171 − 300) (> 300)
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.602*** 0.676*** 0.724*** 0.811*** 0.811***
[0.040] [0.028] [0.033] [0.022] [0.027]
R2 0.300 0.330 0.352 0.335 0.339
Number of observations 11,342 11,342 11,342 11,342 11,342
Panel B: Income Cohorts (Tenants)
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Income Interval (e1000) (< 16) (16 − 20) (20 − 24) (24 − 32) (> 32)
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.515*** 0.597*** 0.599*** 0.625*** 0.598***
[0.020] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011]
R2 0.169 0.213 0.245 0.243 0.243
Number of observations 332,299 332,225 332,275 332,284 332,305
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption).Control variables are included in all regressions.
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. 2010, 2011 are excluded from the analysis of wealth cohorts,
since the information is not available for these years.
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”.
Households are assigned to the groups based on their wealth and income levels (percentiles).
Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
Another source of heterogeneity relates to the actual gas consumption level of the
household. Using OLS-IV and FE-IV estimators, we obtain the conditional mean of β1,
which leads to the estimation of a uniform rebound effect for all households. However, the
rebound effect may vary depending on the actual gas use intensity of the household. For
example, we expect that households that use more gas because of lower efficiency levels
(including dwelling size) are more sensitive to changes in efficiency. Therefore, the rebound
effect might be larger for these households. In order to capture this heterogeneity, we
use a quantile regression approach (using instrumental variable). This enables estimating
the model for different quantiles of the actual gas use distribution. The linear conditional
quantile function can be estimated by minimizing the sum of absolute residuals at quantile
k for the model specified in Equations (3.4.10)-(3.4.11) as follows:
minβj
n∑
i=1
t∑
t=1
|αi + εit| (3.4.10)
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which can be also written as:
minβj
n∑
i=1
t∑
t=1
|ln(Gait)− [β0 + β1̂ln(Gpit) +
j∑
j=2
βjZjit]| (3.4.11)
Another advantage of the quantile regression approach is its robustness in the presence of
outliers. Therefore, we are also able to check any potential effect of outliers by comparing
the conditional mean estimate of β1 with the quantile regression estimate for the 50th
quantile (median) of actual gas consumption.
In Table 3.7, we estimate the rebound effect for different quantiles of the actual gas
consumption distribution. The 50th quantile (median) estimates of the rebound effect are
quite similar to the conditional mean estimates. We therefore conclude that outliers do
not significantly affect our results. Considering the other quantiles of the distribution,
we observe that as the actual gas consumption intensity of the household increases, the
rebound effect becomes more noticeable. Moving from the 10th quantile to 90th quantile
of the actual gas consumption distribution, the effect increases from 30 percent to 50 percent
for rental dwellings, and from eight percent to 51 percent for owner-occupied dwellings.18
These results imply that the response of households to improvements in energy efficiency
depends on their actual gas consumption intensity level. This can be partly explained
by the non-linear characteristic of the rebound effect – if a household resides in a highly
inefficient dwelling (with a higher theoretical and actual gas consumption level), we can
expect that this household will have a stronger behavioral response to energy efficiency
improvements.
18In Appendix Table 3.C.5, we report the non-IV quantile regression estimation results. As expected,
the coefficient estimates are lower compared to the IV estimates because of the potential measurement
error in the predicted gas consumption variable. For the sample of homeowners, the relative magnitudes
of the quantile coefficients is similar to the IV estimation results. However, we do not observe the same
order for the rental sample, although the estimated rebound effect is still lower for the lowest quantile of
the distribution. This might be associated to the unknown differences in the relative magnitudes of the
measurement error bias.
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Table 3.7: Quantile Regression-IV Estimations for Actual Gas Consumption Levels
Panel A: Sample of Owners
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Actual Gas Consumption (m3) (707) (1,039) (1,481) (2,003) (2,454)
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.922*** 0.826*** 0.750*** 0.644*** 0.492***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Panel B: Sample of Tenants
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Actual Gas Consumption (m3) (590) (846) (1,166) (1,539) (1,917)
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.699*** 0.647*** 0.599*** 0.553*** 0.494***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption). Control variables are included in all regressions.
The values in parentheses represent the actual gas consumption (m3) level for each quantile.
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”.
Quantiles are chosen based on the actual gas use level of the households.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
3.4.5 Quasi-Experimental Evidence
Thus far, we examined the rebound effect in the residential sector based either on the
cross-sectional variation in energy efficiency levels, or on the over-time variation that is
created by households changing their address. Although the fixed-effect estimation results
indicate there is no evidence of omitted variable bias, we further examine the rebound effect
from energy efficiency improvements by using a quasi-experimental setting.
In 2008, the Dutch government initiated a program named “Meer met Minder” (more
with less), to stimulate energy efficiency improvements in the residential sector. In this
program, homeowners received tailored advice on energy saving measures, and in addition,
those homeowners increasing the energy label of their dwelling by one or two steps received
a premium of e300 or e750, respectively. Based on data provided by the program
administrator, AgentschapNL, we estimate the realized savings for these dwellings by using
a standard difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Using a sample of 605 owner-occupied
dwellings that benefited from the subsidy program in 2010, we compare the realized savings
with predicted savings on the consumption levels of these dwellings between 2009 and 2011,
the years just before and after the energy efficiency improvement. We use a large control
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group to isolate any time-specific effects (such as changes in climatic conditions or general
trends in the macro economy that may affect energy consumption). The control group
consists of 4,593 owner-occupied dwellings, that were transacted in 2008 (with a label) and
did not apply to any of the energy efficiency subsidy programs (e.g., tailored advice without
premium, double glazing, solar panel subsidies, etc.) offered by the government during the
period of the analysis.19
In Table 3.8, we report the summary statistics for the treatment and control groups.
The treatment sample shows a slightly higher actual gas consumption and a lower level
of energy efficiency (i.e., a higher energy index) compared to the control group. The
subsidy applicants appear to be wealthier than the households in our control group. The
change in average actual gas consumption for our control group between 2009 and 2011,
which is around nine percent, is assumed to be due to other time variant factors (such
as climate conditions). In order to isolate these time-specific effects in the non-parametric
comparisons, we subtract this change from the percentage change in actual gas consumption
between 2009 and 2011 that is documented for the treatment group. The simple calculation
indicates that there is a reduction of about 15 percent in the actual gas consumption as a
result of a 35 percent increase in the theoretical energy efficiency level of the dwellings in
the treatment group. This points at an average rebound effect of 57 percent for the treated
dwellings.
We estimate the rebound effect based on a regression analysis in order to control for
other factors that might affect the savings in residential energy consumption. We use a
first-difference estimator to identify the average rebound effect for the treated dwellings,
isolating the exogenous variation in the energy efficiency of the dwellings in our treatment
group, generated by the efficiency improvements:
∆ln(Gi) = β0 + β1∆ln(EIi) +
J∑
j=2
βj∆Zji + ∆i (3.4.12)
where ∆ln(Gi) is the change in the logarithm of actual gas consumption from 2009 to 2011
19For both treatment and control groups, we exclude the dwellings in which the household composition
changed from 2009 to 2011.
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Quasi-Experimental Analysis
Treatment Group Control Group
Number of Observations 605 4,593
Variables 2009 2011 %Change 2009 2011 %Change
Actual Gas Consumption (m3) 2,318 1,766 -23.81 1,543 1,399 -9.33
(822) (680) (731) (634)
Energy Index 2.34 1.52 -35.04 1.90 1.90 0.00
(0.39) (0.30) (0.58) (0.58)
Size (m2) 127.8 127.8 104.6 104.6
(35.4) (35.4) (33.2) (33.2)
Construction Year (Median) 1961 1961 1970 1970
Number of Household Members 2.41 2.41 2.04 2.04
(1.08) (1.08) (1.11) (1.11)
Household Annual Net Income (1000 Euro) 40.1 39.8 33.9
(19.5) (17.4) (14.8) (16.8)
Household Wealth (1000 Euro) 285.8 80.3
(265.8) (252.8)
Notes:
Standard deviations are indicated in paranthesis.
Energy index of the dwellings in the control group is assumed to be constant between 2009 and 2011.
We report the infromation on household wealth for only 2009, as it is not available for 2011.
for dwelling i, and ∆ln(EIi) is the change in logarithm of energy index for that dwelling.20
For the dwellings in the control group, the change in energy index is assumed to be equal
to zero. Thus, β1 is the elasticity of the actual gas consumption with respect to energy
efficiency. As there might be a random measurement error in the predicted energy index,
which might cause a downward bias in the estimated β1, we apply an IV approach by using
the assignment to treatment as an instrument for the change in energy index. ∆Zji denotes
the change in household characteristics, and ∆i is the change in error component which
is assumed to be independent of the change in energy index. However, as the treatment
and control groups are not randomly assigned, this assumption may not be valid, and
the estimated β1 might be biased. In order to reduce this potential selection bias, we
apply a propensity score matching (PSM) method, where the probability of being treated
is estimated by using a logit model including dwelling characteristics as regressors. This
20The Energy Index is calculated based on the predicted level of energy that is required for heating and
lighting. We assume that the efficiency improvements only affect the energy used for heating, as the energy
required for lighting is calculated based on the size of the dwelling and constitutes a negligible share of
total energy demand.
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probability is used as a balancing score between groups, as suggested by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983). For the dwellings in treatment and control groups with the same balancing
score, the distribution of the dwelling characteristics are the same. Thus, by applying
PSM method, we rely on the assumption that conditional on the dwelling characteristics,
the counterfactual change in actual gas consumption is independent of the assignment to
treatment. In other words, we assume that assignment to treatment is not correlated with
unobserved determinants of household’s gas consumption, which might change during the
period of analysis.
Table 3.9 reports the findings. The first-difference estimator leads to an elasticity
parameter of about 41 percent. When we apply the IV approach, the elasticity of actual gas
consumption with respect to efficiency is found to be 44.5 percent. The use of the PSM-IV
method leads to a similar estimate (44.9 percent). These results indicate that the average
rebound effect is around 55 percent for the dwellings in our treatment group. Accordingly,
the estimated average rebound effect for the treatment group is larger compared to the
average estimate that we documented for the full sample of owner-occupied dwellings (27
percent). This difference might be related to the heterogeneity of rebound effect based on
the actual gas use intensity level, as the dwellings that benefited from the subsidy have
higher actual gas consumption as compared to the other dwellings. As documented in Table
3.7, the estimated rebound effect highly depends on the actual gas use intensity level of the
dwelling. The median actual gas consumption for the treatment group is 2,289 m3, which
corresponds to the 80th quantile of actual gas consumption distribution in the full sample.
The estimated average rebound effect for our treatment group is close to the rebound effect
estimated for 90th quantile in the full sample, which is around 52 percent.
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Table 3.9: Difference-in-Differences and Propensity Score Matching Estimations
(1) (2) (3)
First-Diff. IV PSM-IV
∆ Log (Energy Index) 0.408*** 0.445*** 0.449***
[0.031] [0.032] [0.036]
R2 0.034 0.034 0.032
Number of households 5,198 5,198 5,198
Notes:
Dependent variable: ∆ Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Standard errors are indicated in paranthesis.
Years included in the analysis: 2009 and 2011
Income and working status of the household are included as control variables in all regressions.
For the IV and PSM estimations, we use assignment to treatment as an instrument for the change in energy index.
For the PSM estimation, we use dwelling characteristics (age, size, type, province) as determinants of assignment to
treatment.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
3.5 Conclusions and Implications
In the current debate about the reduction of externalities from global carbon emissions,
economists and policy makers increasingly focus on energy efficiency improvements as a
means to affect energy consumption in the building stock. However, it has been asserted
that technological improvements change household behavior, as the corresponding energy
efficiency gains decrease the perceived cost of energy services, thus increasing demand
(Brookes, 1990; Khazzoom, 1980, 1987; Wirl, 1997). This phenomenon has been termed
the “rebound effect”. The existence of the rebound effect is widely acknowledged, but the
real debate lies in the identification and the size of the effect. This is of importance, as
energy conservation policies should be designed to achieve actual energy savings, and not
just to increase the engineering energy efficiency of buildings.
Due to the limited availability of energy efficiency data, empirical estimates of the
rebound effect in the existing literature are mostly based upon households’ response to
variations in energy prices. However, there are significant drawbacks to this methodological
approach, as it may lead to biased estimates (Sorrell et al., 2007). This is the first
study to analyze the rebound effect based on a unique combination of information on the
thermal efficiency of dwellings, their actual energy consumption, and characteristics of the
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occupants. Furthermore, the use of an IV approach and the panel structure of the dataset
enable a more precise identification of a direct rebound effect in residential heating. We use
a large sample of dwellings in the Netherlands to estimate the rebound effect for residential
energy consumption. Examining the association between the engineering predictions on
the energy consumption with the realized gas consumption of some 560,000 dwellings, we
estimate the direct rebound effect. In order to account for random measurement error
in the engineering predictions, we use an instrumental variable approach by including the
dwelling age as an instrument. We document that the average rebound effect is about
41 percent for tenants and 27 percent for homeowners. According to these results, if the
efficiency of an average dwelling is doubled, this will lead to a 59 percent energy reduction
in rental dwellings and a 73 percent energy reduction in owner-occupied dwellings.
The comparison of OLS and IV estimation results indicates the importance of controlling
for the measurement error in engineering predictions. Thus, studies neglecting this error
have the potential of overestimating the rebound effect. We also estimate our model
separately for different wealth cohorts, and document that there is significant heterogeneity
in the estimated rebound effect. The results show that as households becomes wealthier,
the rebound effect decreases. The rebound effect for the lowest wealth quantile is about 40
percent, while it is just 19 percent for the highest wealth quantile. We analyze separately
the heterogeneity of the rebound effect among tenants with different income levels. For the
lowest income quantile, the rebound effect is nearly 49 percent, while it is in the range of
38-40 percent for the upper quantiles. Additionally, using a quantile regression approach,
we examine the heterogeneity of the rebound effect based on the actual gas use intensity
level of the households. The results indicate that the rebound effect is more significant for
the households that are consuming a larger amount of gas to heat their homes. We also
confirm our findings by applying a quasi-experimental analysis. Using the data obtained
from an energy efficiency subsidy program, we show that the efficiency improvements lead
to a rebound effect of around 55 percent. The relative large size of the rebound effect as
compared to the estimates found for the full sample supports the heterogeneity hypothesis,
as the households that invest in the efficiency improvements are at the upper quantiles of
the actual gas consumption distribution in the population.
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Our findings stress the importance of considering the rebound effect in the design of
efficiency improvement policies in residential sector. Policy makers have to incorporate this
effect into the assessment of the effectiveness of energy efficiency improvement measures
and programs, including subsidies and rebates. As confirmed by the quasi-experimental
evidence, there is a significant potential for energy savings in residential sector through
energy efficiency improvements, but the behavioral response of the households offsets part
of the projected energy savings. The heterogeneity of the rebound effect also has some
policy implications. The results in this paper indicate that the magnitude of the rebound
effect varies by wealth, income and energy use level of the household. Thus, in order to
increase the effectiveness of the energy efficiency policy measures, the characteristics of
the target group should be incorporated in decision-making, as well as estimates of the
predicted savings.
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Appendix
3.A Cover Page of the EPC
Source: AgentschapNL
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3.B Calculation of Theoretical Gas Consumption
The calculated gas use (Gp) is assumed to be a combination of gas used for space heating
(Gh) and water heating (Gw).
Gp = Gh +Gw (3.B.1)
The gas used for cooking is not included in the calculations, since it strongly depends
on household behavior. However, we do not expect this to lead to biased estimations, since
cooking typically represents just three percent of the total residential gas consumption.
The gas used for space heating is calculated by the following formula:
Gh = [(Gd/µd)−Gsb]/µi +Gpf (3.B.2)
where Gd is the heating demand of the dwelling. The parameters µd and µi denote the
efficiency of the distribution and installation systems, respectively. Any potential gains
from use of a solar boiler (Gsb) and the additional energy used for pilot flame (Gpf ) are
also accounted for in the prediction. As shown below, in order to calculate the demand for
heating, the transmission (Gt) and ventilation (Gv) losses are summed up, and the internal
(Gi) and solar (Gsg) heating gains are deducted from this aggregate.
Gd = Gt +Gv −Gi −Gsg (3.B.3)
The transmission loss component in the equation above is calculated based on the
following formula:
Gt = (
K∑
k=1
wkAkUk)(Ti − To)t (3.B.4)
where wk is the weighting factor for surface k, which ranges from 0 to 1 depending on
the position of the surface. Ak is the area of the surface and Uk is the U-value of that
surface (an indication of its isolation quality). The heating season duration is denoted by t
and it is assumed to be 212 days. The average indoor (Ti) and outdoor (To) temperatures
are assumed to be 18 degrees Celsius and 5.64 degrees Celsius, respectively. The other
component of equation (3.B.3) is the loss of energy through ventilation, which is calculated
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as follows:
Gv = [f1Af + f2qr(Af/Ar)][δ(Ti − To)t]ρaca (3.B.5)
where f1 and f2 are the ventilation coefficients which depend on the type of ventilation
and the infiltration rate. The usable floor area of the dwelling is denoted by Af , and qr,
Ar are the ventilation loss and the floor area values of a reference house of same type. δ is
the correction factor, ρa is the density of the air, ca is the heat capacity of the air.
The second component of the residential gas consumption is the gas used for water
heating, which is a combination of the gas used by the main boiler (Gmb) and the kitchen
boiler (Gkb).
Gw = Gmb +Gkb (3.B.6)
If there is a hot water system in the kitchen, then the energy consumed by the kitchen
boiler is assumed to be equal to a fixed amount. The gas consumed by the main hot water
installation is calculated as below:
Gmb = (γQ/µb)rq +Gs +Gsc(Af/100)(1− τu) (3.B.7)
Q = Qk +Qb +N(Qp +QsFsNs +QbaNbDb) (3.B.8)
where γ is the conversion factor, Q is the quantity of hot water consumed in a day, µb is
the efficiency of the boiler, rq is a correction factor for short piping, Gs is a fixed value
assigned based on the type of boiler, Gsc is the circulation loss depending on the insulation
level and τu is the used part of the circulation loss. The quantity of the hot water (Q) is
a combination of hot water used in kitchen (Qk), quantity used for basins (Qb), quantity
used for showering (Qs) and quantity used for bath (Qba). N is the assumed number of
people living in the house, which is assigned based on the dwelling size. Fs is the efficiency
of the shower head and Ns is the assumed number of showering per person in a day. Nb is
the assumed number of baths per person in a day and Db is the indicator of existence of
bath (1 or 0).
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3.C Suplementary Tables
Table 3.C.1: Pooled OLS Estimations: Dwellings Constructed after 1999
(1) (2)
Rental Owner-
Occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.492*** 0.588***
[0.015] [0.028]
Number of Household Members 0.094*** 0.157***
[0.013] [0.022]
Number of Household Members2 -0.007*** -0.013***
[0.002] [0.004]
Number of Children (<18) 0.002 - 0.025
[0.006] [0.021]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.002 0.009
[0.004] [0.016]
Number of Female 0.019*** 0.030
[0.004] [0.017]
All Household Members Are Working (1=yes) -0.057*** -0.044**
[0.006] [0.014]
Log (Household income) 0.007 0.032
[0.007] [0.017]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.020*
[0.008]
Province Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Constant 3.298*** 2.336***
[0.111] [0.262]
R2 0.161 0.285
Number of observations 68,112 4,214
Notes:
We restrict the sample to the dwellings which were constructed after 1999.
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
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Table 3.C.2: Instrumental Variable Estimations: U-value Requirement for External Walls
(1) (2)
Rental Owner-
Occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.567*** 0.764***
[0.014] [0.022]
Number of Household Members 0.096*** 0.101***
[0.004] [0.009]
Number of Household Members2 -0.010*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.001]
Number of Children (<18) -0.005*** 0.002
[0.001] [0.003]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.034*** 0.042***
[0.002] [0.004]
Number of Female 0.037*** 0.015***
[0.001] [0.002]
All Household Members Are Working (1=yes) -0.057*** -0.038***
[0.002] [0.004]
Log (Household income) 0.052*** 0.048***
[0.002] [0.006]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.034***
[0.002]
Province Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Constant 2.416*** 1.020***
[0.091] [0.164]
R2 0.243 0.366
Number of observations 1,664,113 87,282
Number of dwellings 519,512 43,498
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Maximum U-value requirement for external walls at the time of
construction”
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
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Table 3.C.3: IV Estimations: Controling for House Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rental Owner- Rental Owner-
Occupied Occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.562*** 0.711*** 0.563*** 0.710***
[0.011] [0.015] [0.012] [0.015]
Number of Household Members 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.099***
[0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.007]
Number of Household Members2 -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Number of Children -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.038***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
Number of Female 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
All Household Members Are Working (1=yes) -0.051*** -0.036*** -0.052*** -0.036***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004]
Log (Household Income) 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034***
[0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.032*** -0.032***
[0.002] [0.002]
Log (House Size) 0.111*** 0.093*** - 0.433* -0.132
[0.012] [0.018] [0.195] [0.203]
Log (House Size)2 0.063*** 0.025
[0.021] [0.022]
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.160*** 1.114*** 3.324*** 1.638***
[0.060] [0.098] [0.402] [0.490]
R2 0.247 0.383 0.247 0.383
Number of observations 1,664,113 87,282 1,664,113 87,282
Number of dwellings 519,512 43,498 519,512 43,498
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and year.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
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Table 3.C.4: Random-Effects (IV) Estimations
Rental Owner-
occupied
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.582*** 0.722***
[0.002] [0.009]
Number of Household Members 0.086*** 0.094***
[0.001] [0.005]
Number of Household Members2 -0.008*** -0.009***
[0.000] [0.001]
Number of Children (<18) 0.001 0.004
[0.001] [0.003]
Number of Elderly (Age>64) 0.026*** 0.034***
[0.001] [0.003]
Number of Female 0.027*** 0.011***
[0.001] [0.003]
All Household Members Are Working(1=yes) -0.026*** -0.016***
[0.001] [0.003]
Log (Household income) 0.054*** 0.075***
[0.001] [0.003]
Receiving Rent Subsidy (1=yes) -0.013***
[0.001]
Province Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Constant 2.705*** 1.568***
[0.019] [0.067]
R2 0.209 0.355
R2 (within) 0.032 0.017
R2 (between) 0.222 0.357
Number of observations 1,664,113 87,282
Number of households 519,512 43,498
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption)
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
“Predicted Gas Consumption” is instrumented by “Year of Construction”
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
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Table 3.C.5: Quantile Regression (Non-IV) Estimations for Actual Gas Consumption Levels
Panel A: Sample of Owners
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.663*** 0.609*** 0.548*** 0.463*** 0.372***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Panel B: Sample of Tenants
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Log (Predicted Gas Consumption) 0.541*** 0.323*** 0.447*** 0.393*** 0.494***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log (Actual Gas Consumption).Control variables are included in all regressions.
Years included in the analysis: 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
Quantiles are chosen based on the actual gas use level of the households.
* P<0.05. ** P<0.01. *** P<0.001
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Chapter 4
Capitalization of Energy Efficiency in
the Housing Market
4.1 Introduction
In today’s heated debate about climate change, and related, the carbon externality from
energy consumption, energy efficiency seems the panacea that is globally embraced by
policy makers. For example, the recent Clean Power Plan proposed by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allows for investment in energy efficiency as a
substitute for cutting carbon emissions from actual energy generation. Across the ocean,
the EU aims for a 20 percent reduction in energy consumption, based solely on “cost
effective” measures that are paid back from reduction in energy bills. And China has
included energy efficiency as a cornerstone of its current five-year plan, with the ambition
to retrofit four million square feet of non-residential space. But of course, the success of
such programs depends on the willingness of homeowners, developers, and commercial real
estate investors to invest in building upgrades.
Economists have long recognized that market failures can lead to what has been termed
the “energy efficiency gap” – the difference between the optimal level of energy efficiency
and the level actually realized (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Following on Akerlof (1970)’s
classic “lemons” model, information asymmetry between seller and buyer is generally
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accepted as one of the main reasons leading to underinvestment in energy efficiency in the
housing market. In the absence of information, buyers are not able to incorporate future
energy costs of the home into their purchasing decisions, and therefore, sellers prefer not to
invest in energy efficiency improvements. In recent years, energy labels have been proposed
as a remedy to this potential market failure. In 2009, in order to provide information
transparency in the relative energy consumption of buildings, EU member states were
required to implement energy performance certification (EPC) schemes for residential
dwellings. By providing information to market participants about energy performance
of buildings, policy makers expect an increase in the demand for energy-efficient dwellings,
which in return, may lead to higher investment in energy efficiency.
However, the effectiveness of this policy hinges on the extent to which buyers are willing
to pay for increased energy efficiency. Furthermore, as upgrading a dwelling to improve its
energy efficiency could involve a significant financial investment, the uncertainty regarding
its financial return may be another reason for households not to undertake seemingly
profitable investments in energy efficiency. Therefore, from both the policy maker’s and
investor’s perspective, it is important to identify the market value of energy efficiency in
the housing sector.
Previous literature provides some empirical evidence on the relationship between
energy efficiency and home prices. Using a sample of dwellings with Energy Performance
Certificates, Brounen and Kok (2011) document that consumers pay a four percent premium
for green-labeled (labels A, B and C) houses in the Netherlands. Similarly, analyzing the
property market in the Republic of Ireland, Hyland et al. (2013) find that the transaction
price increases as the energy efficiency rating of the dwelling improves. Kahn and Kok
(2014), using the transaction data from California housing market, find that houses labeled
with a green label is sold at a small price premium compared to the non-labeled houses.
As energy labels are not necessarily available in other countries, researchers have also
used other approaches to identify the market value of energy efficiency. Thorsnes and
Bishop (2013) examine the capitalization of building standards that were introduced in
New Zealand in 1978, and find a positive premium for the dwellings that were constructed
after the legislation. Similarly, Koirala et al. (2014) estimate the value of energy efficiency
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building codes for American households, and find that building codes are capitalized into
housing rents. Laquatra (1986) analyzes a sample of houses constructed through the Energy
Efficient Housing Demonstration Program of the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, and
identifies the market values of energy efficiency investments based on a vector of thermal
integrity factors. Zheng et al. (2012) document that “green” buildings, which are identified
based on an index created using Google search, are sold at a price premium at the pre-sale
stage. Comparable to these findings, Dastrup et al. (2012) find that solar panel installations
are capitalized into house prices at around a 3.5 percent price premium in California.
While this body of literature is significant and growing, the most common
methodological drawback of the evidence provided is the potential bias that may arise
due to omission of unobserved dwelling characteristics that are correlated with measures of
energy efficiency, as indicated by Zheng et al. (2012), Hyland et al. (2013) and Thorsnes and
Bishop (2013). Klier and Linn (2012) also document the same problem while analyzing
the capitalization of energy efficiency for the automobile sector. Typically, in order to
minimize the omitted variable bias, the empirical strategy is to include detailed dwelling
characteristics in hedonic model. However, this method does not rule out the presence of
unobservable factors, and multicollinearity among the observed characteristics often leads
to imprecise and implausible estimates of attribute prices. Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984)
mention that the difficulties caused by multicollinearity are more apparent while analyzing
energy efficiency, leading to insignificant and/or theoretically incorrect estimates for the
coefficients of energy efficiency.
In this study, using a large representative dataset from the Netherlands, we propose an
instrumental variable approach in order to identify the capitalization of energy efficiency in
the housing market. Our analysis benefits from a continuous measure of energy efficiency
provided by Energy Performance Certificates, which enables us to estimate the elasticity
of home prices with respect to its energy efficiency. As well as including detailed dwelling
characteristics in the hedonic model, we use an instrumental variable approach to solve the
issue of a potential omitted variable bias. We exploit the 1973-74 oil crisis, which created an
exogenous discontinuity in the energy efficiency levels of the dwellings constructed before
and after this date, and the evolution of building codes as instruments for energy efficiency.
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Our results indicate that the OLS estimates are biased downwards: using an IV approach,
we find that as the energy efficiency level increases by 50 percent, the market value of
the dwelling increases by around 11 percent for an average dwelling in the Dutch housing
market.
Furthermore, in order to investigate whether the value of energy efficiency increases
when information transparency is higher through disclosure of an Energy Performance
Certificate, we create a common energy efficiency measure for certified and non-certified
dwellings, which is based on their actual energy consumption. We find that the market
value of a percentage change in actual gas consumption is close to the value of the energy
efficiency change that is estimated based on the energy efficiency indicator provided by
Energy Performance Certificate. Our findings do not provide any evidence suggesting
a higher capitalization rate for dwellings that are transacted with Energy Performance
Certificate. We also use a regression discontinuity approach to test whether the label
(classification) itself has a market value. Our results do not indicate a significant change
in the transaction price at the threshold energy efficiency level that is used to assign the
dwellings into different label classes. This implies that, after controlling for the continuous
energy efficiency level, the labeling itself does not lead to a significant change in buyer’s
valuation of the dwelling.
Finally, in order to examine the over-time variation in the market value of energy
efficiency, we estimate the hedonic model for each year separately from 2003 to 2011. We
document that, although not statistically significant, the value of energy efficiency has
doubled from 2003 to 2011, which might be partly related to the increase of energy prices,
the relative decrease in house prices after 2008 and the general impact of policies and
campaigns indicating the importance of energy efficiency.
Our findings suggest that, regardless of the provision of energy label, energy efficiency
is significantly capitalized in the housing market. This implies that, in addition to the
immediate financial benefits from lower energy expenses, energy efficiency improvements
lead to higher transaction prices at the time of sale. Our results do not provide any
significant evidence for intangible effects of energy labels on sale prices. For policy makers,
the results of this paper may help in refining energy performance certification programs in a
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way that stresses the financial benefits of energy efficiency. Furthermore, as also mentioned
by Allcott and Greenstone (2012), information campaigns might have a substantial role in
the diffusion of energy efficiency investments. Therefore, the benefits that households and
investors can derive (in terms of higher transaction prices) need to be highlighted in the
public awareness campaigns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
empirical specification and the data. In section 3, we present the methodology and the
results. Section 4 provides a brief conclusion.
4.2 Empirical Specification and Data
Hedonic models are commonly used in the economics literature to estimate the value of
individual attributes of a product (Rosen, 1974). When analyzing the property market,
the size of the estimated coefficient on each variable represents the implicit value of that
characteristic. Accordingly, our basic hedonic model takes the following form:
Log(Pricei) = β0 + β1Log(Ei) + βjXi + αn + ti + εi (4.1)
where the dependent variable, Pricei, is the transaction price of dwelling i. Ei is the
variable of interest which represents the energy efficiency level of the dwelling, and Xi is
a vector of other dwelling characteristics. By using a log-log specification, we are able to
estimate the elasticity of house price with respect to energy efficiency, which is denoted
by β1. To control for the unobserved location amenities, we include neighborhood fixed
effects (αn) in our model. ti is a vector of transaction year dummies, which accounts for
the macroeconomic factors that may influence house prices.
In order to estimate this model, we benefit from the transaction data provided by the
National Association of Realtors (NVM) in the Netherlands. This data set contains detailed
information on the characteristics of the dwellings transacted between 2003-2011, as well
as their transaction price. To analyze the energy efficiency of dwellings, we match this data
set with the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) database managed by AgencyNL.
Following the EU directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings, energy
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performance certification for transacted dwellings was introduced in the Netherlands in
January 2008.1 The energy performance certificate is issued by a professionally trained
expert. The expert visits the dwelling and inspects its physical characteristics such as size,
structure, quality of insulation, heating installation, ventilation, solar systems, and built-in
lighting. The collected information is then used to predict the total energy consumption
of the dwelling by using an engineering model, which is described in detail by Aydin et al.
(2014). After scaling by the size and the heating loss area of the dwelling, the prediction is
transformed into an Energy Performance Index (EPI), which is used to assign the dwelling
to a certain label class ranging from “A++” for exceptionally energy-efficient dwellings, to
“G” for highly inefficient dwellings. The EPC database includes detailed information on
energy performance of dwellings, as well as information on some other characteristics (such
as year of construction) of these dwellings.
As the certification program started in 2008, we limit our sample to the dwellings that
were transacted between 2008-2011. We also exclude the dwellings that were constructed
before 1900 or after 1999, as these dwellings are exempted from mandatory disclosure of
an EPC label. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our sample to single-family dwellings,
which account for nearly 70 percent of the total transactions.2 Finally, we eliminate
outliers that are detected based on the sample distribution of house size, price, and energy
performance index – the upper and lower boundaries for the outliers are set at the first
and 99th percentile. This leads to a sample of 30,036 single-family dwellings that were
transacted with an EPC between 2008-2011.
Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of transaction price, energy performance index and
construction year of the dwellings in our sample. A higher energy performance index
(EPI) indicates a lower energy efficiency level. According to this simple graph, most of
the dwellings in the sample have an EPI value between 1-3, are constructed after 1950,
1Dwellings that have been constructed after 1999, or that are registered as monuments, are exempted
from mandatory disclosure of the energy performance certificate. If the buyer of the dwelling signs a waiver,
the seller is also exempt from providing the certificate.
2Bailey (1966) notes that, compared to single-family dwellings, apartment units may present special
diffuculties of specification and measurement, and differences in the valuation of attributes between these
two type of dwellings might exist. Similarly, Ridker and Henning (1967) and Kahn and Kok (2014) pay
attention to single-family dwellings when analyzing the energy efficiency and house prices.
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and sold at a price ranging from e100,000 to e300,000. Table 4.1 further documents
the summary statistics for some of the main characteristics of the sample, distinguishing
between “energy-efficient” (EPI<median) and “inefficient” (EPI>median) dwellings in our
sample. According to these statistics, on average, efficient dwellings are sold at a higher
price, have a larger size, and are more recently constructed as compared to the inefficient
dwellings.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Energy Performance Index, Construction Year and Transaction
Price
Source: AgentschapNL, National Association of Realtors (NVM)
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Energy Efficient and Inefficient Dwellings
Energy-efficient dwellings Energy-inefficient dwellings
EPI≤1.8 EPI>1.8
Number of Observations 15,170 14,866
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Transaction Price (e1000) 229.3 (108.3) 210.8 (109.6)
Energy Performance Index (EPI) 1.507 (0.171) 2.342 (0.417)
Size (m2) 122.9 (34.2) 116.3 (33.4)
Number of Rooms 4.822 (1.050) 4.835 (1.077)
Number of Floors 2.750 (0.545) 2.750 (0.592)
Year of Construction(Median) 1981 1965
Type (fraction)
Corner 0.249 0.257
Semi-detached 0.103 0.139
Between or Townhouse 0.552 0.508
Detached 0.096 0.096
Transaction Year (fraction)
2008 0.435 0.425
2009 0.206 0.218
2010 0.172 0.176
2011 0.187 0.181
As a first analysis of the relationship between energy efficiency and house price, we plot
the observed house price for varying levels of energy efficiency in Figure 4.2. In Panel A,
using unadjusted prices, we obtain a U-shaped relationship between EPI and the value of
the dwelling, which is not fully in line with expectations. This may be due to the omission
of the other determinants of the house price, which are correlated with energy efficiency
(such as dwelling type, location, construction year, etc.). In panel B, we plot the residuals
estimated based on a hedonic model that includes all determinants of home price except the
EPI. We observe a more distinct relationship in this graph, indicating that as the energy
efficiency of a dwelling is lower, the transaction price decreases.
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Figure 4.2: Transaction Prices and the Level of Energy Efficiency
Source: AgentschapNL, National Association of Realtors (NVM), authors’ calculations
4.3 Methodology and Results
4.3.1 OLS Estimations
We first estimate the model in equation (4.1) using an ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation, assuming that the energy performance index (EPIi), which is used as a measure
of energy efficiency (Ei), is independent of the error term (εi). The results are presented
in Table 4.2.3 When we include the EPI as the sole regressor (column 1), the estimated
impact of a 100 percent increase in the EPI is about 23 percent decrease in the value
3You can see detailed estimation results in Appendix Table 4.B.1
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of the house. This impact decreases to 11 percent when we include the other dwelling
characteristics. In column 3, we also include the construction year of the dwelling, as it is
expected to be strongly correlated with the energy efficiency level. Controlling for all other
factors, we document that a 100 percent increase in the energy performance index leads to
a five percent decrease in the market value of the house.4 This implies that if the energy
requirements are halved, the market value of that dwelling increases by 2.5 percent, which
corresponds to a price premium of e5,000 for the average dwelling in our sample. This
result does not show a significant variation when we specify year of construction as dummy
variables, instead of a continuous variable (column 4).
Table 4.2: OLS Estimation Results: House Prices and Energy Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Energy Performance Index) -0.235*** -0.106*** -0.052*** -0.048***
[0.019] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Dwelling Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Construction Year No No Yes Yes
R2 0.106 0.836 0.843 0.846
Number of observations 30,036 30,036 30,036 30,036
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Construction year is included as a third order polynomial in specification (3). In specification (4), we included dummy
variables representing each construction year.
In all regressions, neighborhood and year of transaction dummies are included.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
Although we use a large representative sample and control for the detailed dwelling
characteristics in the OLS estimations, there is a potential bias in the estimated value
of energy efficiency. The presence of unobserved determinants of the house price, which
might be correlated with the energy efficiency level may influence the estimated coefficient.
4We also examine whether the unobserved determinants of label adoption is correlated with the error
term in equation (4.1), which might lead to biased estimates. In order to test this, we first estimate a probit
model to predict the individual probability of label adoption in our sample of labeled and non-labeled
houses. Next, as proposed by Heckman (1979), we include the inverse Mills ratio in our model. The results
indicate that there is not a significant correlation between the error term of model specified in equation (4.1)
and the error term of the estimated probit model (p-value of the log-likelihood test is 0.176). Therefore,
we conclude that there is not evidence for a sample selectivity bias.
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Depending on the direction of the correlation between these unobserved factors and price,
and between the unobserved factors and the energy efficiency level, this can either be a
downward or upward bias. Furthermore, in case we control for the construction year in
OLS estimates, the high level of multicollinearity between construction year and the energy
performance index may increase the magnitude of a bias.5
Another econometric issue that may cause a biased estimate is the presence of
measurement error in the engineering calculations. It could be the case that the engineering
calculations include a measurement error, because of the assumptions made in the
calculation method, and the potential mistakes made during the inspection.6 We assume
that the predicted energy efficiency (EPI) is a combination of the true value (EPI∗) and a
random error component (e) that has a mean value equal to zero and that is not correlated
with the true energy efficiency level. In this case, the OLS assumption that the EPI is
independent of the error term may not be valid. The presence of this random measurement
error leads to a downward bias in the OLS estimate of β1.
In order to overcome the potential bias originating from unobserved factors and
measurement error, a common approach is to use the instrumental variable (IV) method.
Such an IV needs to be correlated with the true energy efficiency level (EPI∗), but has to
be independent of both the measurement error (e) and the unobserved determinants of the
dwelling price. In our case, an exogenous variation in energy efficiency can be considered as
an instrument satisfying both of these conditions. Accordingly, we focus on the evolution
of energy efficiency based on construction year of the dwelling.
5See Mela and Kopalle (2002) for a theoretical explanation of the relationship between multicollinearity
and the magnitude of bias.
6Especially for older dwellings, the engineer has to make assumptions regarding the U-value of outside
walls and the rates of ventilation and infiltration. As the engineering models are examined through energy
simulation tests and verified by pilot studies, we do not expect a significant systematic bias in the calculated
energy efficiency level (Poel et al., 2007). Besides, a simple examination of the data on re-inspection of
a sample of labeled dwellings indicates that the inspection error is not systematically and significantly
correlated with the true value (Aydin et al., 2014).
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4.3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
Energy prices are one of the main drivers of the energy efficiency investments, as rising
prices make thermal comfort more costly for households and decreases the payback
period.7 Appendix 4.A presents the development of oil prices from 1900 to 2000. The
most remarkable increase in oil prices took place in 1974, when oil prices rose by 260
percent. Therefore, dwellings that were constructed just after the oil crisis may be more
energy-efficient than the previously constructed dwellings. Indeed, as presented in Figure
4.3, there is a clear structural break and discontinuity in the average energy efficiency level
of the dwellings constructed after this increase of energy prices.8 The increased energy
efficiency level can be considered as a combined result of the households’ demand for more
energy-efficient dwellings (and appliances), as well as the revision of building codes after
the oil crisis.
Figure 4.3: Efficiency Level of the Dwellings by Year of Construction
Source: AgentschapNL, authors’ calculations
7See Knittel (2011), Li et al. (2009) and Klier and Linn (2010) for the analysis of how gasoline prices
drive the fuel efficiency in the automobile sector.
8Haas and Schipper (1998) mention that after the decrease in residential energy demand following the
1973-74 oil crisis, energy demand did not rebound in times of declining energy prices (e.g., in 1985). They
argue that irreversible efficiency improvements, which took place after the 1973-74 oil crisis, might be a
reason for this observation.
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Starting in 1965, the Dutch government introduced minimum legal requirements for
the thermal efficiency level of new construction. This legislation set a maximum allowable
U-value for each component (walls, windows, floor and roof) of the dwelling. The U-value
is defined as the amount of heat loss through a single square meter of material, for every
degree difference in temperature at either side of the material.9 Figure 4.4 presents the
over-time variation in the maximum allowable U-value requirements for the external walls
of new constructions in the Netherlands. In order to reach the goal of zero energy buildings,
these requirements have been strengthened over time. Figure 4.3 shows that the average
efficiency level of constructed dwellings is quite stable until the 1960s, and starts increasing
(decreasing EPI) at the time of the introduction of the first building code in 1965. After
the substantial increase in energy costs in 1973-74, the increasing trend in energy efficiency
accelerates, forced by stricter building codes.
Figure 4.4: Maximum Allowable U-value for External Walls of New Constructions in NL
Source: AgentschapNL
In order to identify the impact of energy efficiency on house prices, we first exploit the
exogenous change in energy efficiency that took place in 1974 as an instrument, assuming
9For example, one square meter of a standard single glazed window transmits about 5.6 watts of energy
for each degree difference at either side of the window, and thus has a U-Value of 5.6 W/m2. On the other
hand, a double glazed window has a U-value of 2.8 W/m2.
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that unobservable characteristics do not vary discontinuously in 1974. Based on the year
of construction, we assign the dwellings which were constructed after 1974 as the dwellings
which were exposed to significantly higher energy costs during their construction. Our
main identifying assumption is that unobserved characteristics vary continuously with the
year of construction. Thus, any discontinuity of the conditional distribution of the energy
efficiency as a function of the year of construction in 1974 can be considered as the evidence
of a causal effect of the oil crisis.10
To obtain more accurate estimates of the trends in energy efficiency before and after
the exogenous shock, and to be able to compare dwellings having similar characteristics,
we limit our sample of dwellings to those that were constructed between 1967-1982. This
enables us to identify the discontinuity in energy efficiency by isolating the trend effect
that might be correlated with the over-time change in unobserved characteristics of the
constructed dwellings (such as time-variant luxury attributes in homes). Figure 4.5 (Panel
A) presents the discontinuity in energy efficiency of dwellings in 1974. We benefit from this
exogenous change as an instrument for the energy efficiency in our hedonic model. As can
be observed in Panel B of Figure 4.5, there is a clear jump in house prices for the dwellings
that were constructed after 1974.
10Vollaard and Van Ours (2011) use a similar approach when analyzing the impact of stricter built-in
security standards on burglary rate.
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Figure 4.5: Energy Efficiency and Price of the Dwellings Constructed Before and After
1974
Source: AgentschapNL, National Association of Realtors (NVM), authors’ calculations
Using the discontinuity in energy efficiency as an instrument for the energy performance
index (EPI), we are able to disentangle the true (and exogenous) variation in energy
efficiency. Thus, the first and second stage regression models of the IV estimation can
be written as:
Log(EPIi) = α0 + α1D1974i + α2Ti + α3D1974i Ti + αjXi + τi + ηn + i (4.2)
Log(Pricei) = δ0 + δ1 ̂Log(EPIi) + δ2Ti + δ3D1974i Ti + δjXi + ti + αn + εi (4.3)
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where T indicates the construction year of the dwelling and D1974 is a dummy variable
which is equal to one for the dwellings that were constructed after 1974 and zero otherwise.
By specifying time trends separately before and after 1974, we are able to capture the
exogenous variation in energy efficiency.
Table 4.3 reports the results of the IV estimations that are based on different sample
specifications. Results of the first stage regression model imply that average energy
requirement of the dwellings that were constructed after 1974 oil crisis is about 6-8 percent
lower than previously constructed dwellings.11 The results in column (1), which are based
on the sample of dwellings constructed between 1967-1982, indicate that a 100 percent
increase in energy performance index will lead to a decrease in the market value of the
dwelling by around 22 percent. The estimated coefficient does not vary significantly as we
extend our sample further by including the dwellings that were constructed long before and
after the oil shock (columns 2 and 3). Thus, assuming that the change in energy efficiency
in 1974 is exogenous, the IV results provide evidence that the value of energy efficiency is
underestimated in the OLS regressions.
11You can see the detailed first-stage and second stage estimation results in Appendix Table 4.B.2 and
Table 4.B.3, respectively
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Table 4.3: IV Estimation Results (Discontinuity in 1974): House Prices and Energy
Efficiency
Construction Period (1967-1982) (1959-1990) (1950-1999)
Log(Energy Performance Index) -0.227*** -0.185** -0.198***
[0.090] [0.085] [0.064]
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Construction Year Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.852 0.852 0.854
First Stage
D1974 -0.080*** -0.060*** -0.073***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
F statistic for excluded instrument 74.03 73.20 134.85
Number of observations 12,513 20,270 25,311
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
Energy Index is instrumented by D1974
In all regressions, we include dwelling characteristics, linear construction year variable (before and after 1974),
neighborhood and year of transaction dummies as control variables.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
The identifying assumption of using a discontinuity in energy efficiency as an instrument
is that the timing of the oil shock does not coincide with a discontinuity in unobserved
dwelling characteristics that might also affect the price of the house. Although this
assumption cannot be tested directly, we examine the validity of our findings by using
an alternative instrument that is specifically targeted at energy efficiency of new buildings
and that exhibits more variation (compared to a one-time energy price shock). We use the
over-time variation in the stringency of building codes as an alternative instrument for the
energy performance index (EPI). We use the maximum allowable U-value requirement for
outside walls as a proxy for the stringency of the building codes (see Figure 4.4).
Table 4.4 documents the IV estimation results that are based on the evolution of U-value
requirements for external walls of newly constructed homes.12 The first stage regression
12You can see the detailed first-stage and second stage estimation results in Appendix Table 4.B.4 and
Table 4.B.5, respectively
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results indicate that the U-value requirement is significantly associated with the energy
efficiency level of the dwellings that were constructed under that requirement, which is
in line with the findings of Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013). According to the estimated
coefficient on energy performance index (EPI), as the predicted energy requirement of an
average dwelling doubles, the market value of that dwelling decreases by around 21 percent,
which is close the results of the discontinuity approach.13 These findings imply that if the
energy requirement of a dwelling is reduced by half, its market value increases by around
11 percent, which corresponds to about e23,000 for the average dwelling in our sample.
Table 4.4: IV Estimation Results (Building Codes): House Prices and Energy Efficiency
Log(Energy Performance Index) -0.214***
[0.074]
Dwelling Characteristics Yes
Construction Year Yes
R2 0.837
First Stage Results
U-value 0.071***
[0.006]
F statistic for excluded instrument 138.00
Number of observations 30,036
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
We include dwelling characteristics, construction year variable, neighborhood and year of transaction dummies as control
variables in the regression.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
13According to the results provided by Brounen and Kok (2011), green labeled (A, B, C) houses are sold
with a 3.6 percent price premium compared to the non-green (D, E, F, G) houses. Our sample statistics
indicate that the average energy performance index of green houses are 40 percent less than the non-green
houses. Thus, assuming linearity, we can conclude that their results imply an elastcity around nine percent
which is lower than our estimate. On the other side, Thorsnes and Bishop (2013) document that the
building code legislation that was introduced in 2002 in New Zealand (leading to a 39 percent increase in
energy efficiency) has led to a 14 percent increase in the market value of dwellings that were constructed
after the legislation. Again assuming linearity, this result implies an elasticity around 35 percent which is
larger compared to our estimate. However, it should be noted that the calculated elasticity parameters in
both studies fall within our estimate of 95 percent confidence interval.
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From the homeowner’s perspective, the question of interest is, of course, what our
findings suggest about the value of energy efficiency relative to its cost. According to the
statistics provided by MilieuCentraal (Center for Environment) – a government agency,
in order to decrease the energy requirement of the average dwelling in our sample by
50 percent, the required saving measures cost around e15,000.14 This implies that, for
homeowners, more than the invested amount is paid back in the resale stage. In addition
to this price premium, households realize lower energy bills as a result of the improved
energy efficiency. Given that in 2011 the gas consumption of an average house in our
sample was 1,650 m3 and the price of gas was 0.65 cent per m3, households realize an
estimated e535 annual saving as a result of a 50 percent decrease in the required level of
energy.15
4.3.3 The Impact of Information Provision
Information asymmetry is generally accepted as one of the main reasons why households
underinvest in profitable energy efficiency investment projects (Gillingham et al., 2009).
14According to the information provided by MilieuCentraal, the estimated unit costs of insulating the
components of a dwelling are; e40/m2 for floors, e100/m2 for outside walls, e60/m2 for the roof, e160/m2
for windows and e2,900 for a boiler (see “http://www.milieucentraal.nl/” for detailed information). Given
that the average dwelling in our sample has a 59 m2 of floor area, 82 m2 of roof area, 65 m2 of external
wall area and 25 m2 of window area, if all the saving measures are implemented for the average dwelling
in our sample, this leads to a 70 percent reduction in the expected energy use. The total cost of this
reurbishment is e20,680. Assuming linearity, a 50 percent reduction in the required energy costs around
e15,000. However, it should be noted the effectiveness of different saving measures might vary based on
their simplicity. Our calculation is based on the saving measures that are necessary in order to decrease
the energy requirement of an average dwelling by 70 percent.
15Energy efficiency investments at the time of construction might be even more profitable. According
to a study published by Energy Research center of the Netherlands (Menkveld, Leidelmeijer, Tigchelaar,
Vethman, Cozijnsen, Heemskerk, and Schulenberg, Menkveld et al.), the material cost of a dwelling that
is constructed with an energy performance index (EPI) value of 0.8 is e3,500 higher relative to a dwelling
with an EPI value of 1.0. Assuming that the difference between the expected energy requirements of
these dwellings is 20 percent ((1.0-0.8)/1.0=0.2), and the relationship between energy efficiency and its
cost is linear, a 50 percent reduction in energy requirement of a dwelling (with an EPI value of 1.0) costs
around e8,750 at the time of its construction. Comparing this estimated cost with the estimated value
of energy efficiency in the housing market (e23,000), we can conclude that there is a significant financial
return for the energy efficiency investments made during construction. However, it should be noted that
this comparison needs to be interpreted carefully as the estimated value of energy efficiency represents
the average dwelling in our sample with an EPI value of 1.8 and, on the other side, the estimated cost
represents a dwelling with an EPI value of 1.0. We might expect diminishing returns to investing in energy
efficiency. If so, the the market value of energy efficiency for a dwelling with an EPI value of 1.0 will be
lower than the average dwelling and thus, the financial return of investment might be lower.
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The underlying mechanism is that, if energy efficiency information is not available,
consumers are not able to incorporate the operating costs into their purchasing decisions,
which in return leads to lower investments in energy efficiency. So far, in order to
enhance the transparency of energy efficiency in the real estate market, energy performance
certificates have been used as the main policy instrument in many of the EU countries.
This provision of information is expected to enable households and investors to take energy
efficiency into account in their purchasing and investment decisions, thus leading to a higher
capitalization rate of energy efficiency. Given that our results show that energy efficiency
is capitalized in a sample of the certified dwellings, the question that remains is how the
provision of an energy label affects the capitalization rate of energy efficiency in the market
for single-family dwellings.
In order to test whether the capitalization of energy efficiency varies with the disclosure
of an EPC, we create a common energy efficiency measure for certified and non-certified
dwellings. Since the energy performance index is not available for non-certified dwellings, we
benefit from the variation in actual energy consumption to estimate the model in equation
(4.1). We match our data set with annual gas consumption data provided by Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for the years between 2004-2011.16 We calculate the average
annual gas consumption (per m2) level for each dwelling, and use this as a proxy for the
energy efficiency level of that dwelling (See Figure 4.6, Panel A for the relationship between
gas consumption per m2 and the EPI).17 CBS also provides information on the household
characteristics, including household composition and their income level. We calculate the
average characteristics of the households that reside in each dwelling between 2004-2011.
We include these average household characteristics in the model as control variables, as
they might be correlated with gas consumption (Brounen et al., 2012). In order to obtain
information on the exact year of construction of the non-certified dwellings, we merge our
16Since residential electricity consumption in the Netherlands highly depends on the use of household
appliances instead of the characteristics of the dwelling, we do not include household’s electricity
consumption as a measure of home’s energy efficiency in our analysis. According to the statistics provided
by Odyssee database, in 2011, nearly 85 percent of residential electricity consumption is used for household
appliances in the Netherlands, and the share of electricity used for air cooling is about 0.3 percent.
17The gas consumption data is not available for the years 2005 and 2007. While calculating the
dwelling’s average gas consumption level, we correct for annual heating degree days and exclude the years
of transaction.
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data set with the housing data provided by CBS. Finally, we exclude the outliers detected
based on the sample distribution of gas consumption per m2, transaction price, house size
and household income level (the upper and lower boundaries for the outliers are set at the
first and 99th percentile). The complete sample includes 103,834 dwellings that transacted,
without EPC, between 2008-2011.
Figure 4.6: Gas Consumption per m2, Energy Performance Index and Year of Construction
Source: AgentschapNL, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), authors’ calculations
In Table 4.5, we report some of the descriptive statistics for certified and non-certified
dwellings separately. The transaction price for non-certified dwellings is significantly larger
compared to certified dwellings. This might be due to the larger fraction of detached and
semi-detached houses in the sample of non-certified dwellings. The efficiency indicator,
which is proxied by gas consumption per m2, is not statistically different for certified and
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non-certified dwellings. The average dwelling in our sample is occupied by two people
who have an average annual income around e35,000 (e31,000 for certified dwellings). The
average annual gas consumption is 1,800 m3 for non-certified dwellings and 1,650 m3 for
certified dwellings. According to these statistics, given that the consumer price of gas was
65 cents per m3 in 2011, the annual gas expenditure of the average consumer corresponds
to nearly four percent of the income of the average household in our sample – a sizable
expenditure.
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Non-certified and Certified Dwellings
Non-certified Dwellings Certified Dwellings
Number of Observations 103,834 23,187
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Transaction Price (e1000) 257.0 (113.3) 214.5 (100.1)
Gas Consumption (m3) 1,795 (646) 1,647 (581)
Size (m2) 126.9 (31.1) 117.5 ( 29.8 )
Gas Consumption Intensity(m3/m2) 14.44 (4.82) 14.35 (4.67)
Number of Rooms 4.976 (1.073) 4.807 (1.032)
Number of Floors 2.790 (0.556) 2.756 (0.560)
Year of Construction(Median) 1965 1968
Type (fraction)
Corner 0.205 0.258
Semi-detached 0.164 0.121
Between or Townhouse 0.490 0.537
Detached 0.141 0.084
Transaction Year (fraction)
2008 0.277 0.434
2009 0.230 0.205
2010 0.257 0.173
2011 0.236 0.188
Household Characteristics
Number of Household Members 2.405 (1.011) 2.270 (0.934)
Number of Elderly (Age>65) 0.343 (0.547) 0.332 (0.513)
Number of Children (Age<18) 0.597 (0.774) 0.529 (0.696)
Number of Female Household Members 1.209 (0.625) 1.158 (0.585)
Household Income (e1000) 35.34 (14.74) 31.21 (13.32)
First, we use OLS to estimate the market value of energy efficiency for non-certified
dwellings. The gas consumption per m2 is used as a proxy for the energy efficiency level
of the dwelling. In column (1) of Table 4.6, we report the results of the estimation of the
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model without including control variables.18 According to the estimated coefficient, if the
actual gas consumption per m2 is doubled, the value of the house decreases by around seven
percent. However, when we include control variables, the sign of the estimated coefficient
becomes significantly positive, which is contrary to expectations. According to the results
reported in column (4), keeping the dwelling and household characteristics fixed, if the
gas expenditure is doubled, the value of the dwelling increases by around ten percent for
non-certified dwellings. The estimated coefficient is nearly the same when we estimate the
model for the certified dwellings (column 5).19
Table 4.6: OLS Estimation Results for Non-certified and Certified Dwellings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Actual Gas Cons. per m2) -0.071*** 0.049*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.086***
[0.008] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
Dwelling Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Construction Year No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.010 0.756 0.774 0.794 0.855
Number of observations 103,834 103,834 103,834 103,834 23,187
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Household characteristics are: number of household members, number of children (age<18), number of elderly (age>65),
number of females and household net income
Construction year is included as a third order polynomial.
In column (5), we estimate the same model for the sample of certified dwellings.
In all regressions, neighborhood and year of transaction dummies are included.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
A potential explanation for these findings is that, due to the omission of unobserved
factors and the presence of multicollinearity between actual gas consumption and other
dwelling characteristics, the OLS estimation leads to a biased result (Atkinson and
Halvorsen, 1984; Mela and Kopalle, 2002). Therefore, we again use an IV approach in
order to isolate the exogenous variation in actual gas consumption resulting from stricter
building codes (See Figure 4.6, Panel B for the over-time variation in gas consumption per
18You can see the detailed estimation results in Appendix Table 4.B.6
19Using a similar approach, Cerin et al. (2014) also reports a positive price premium for decreased level
of energy efficiency for the average dwelling in Sweden.
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m2 of new dwellings). We estimate the same model using the evolution of building codes
as an instrument for actual gas consumption per m2. Table 4.7 documents the results of
the IV estimation using the maximum U-value requirement for external walls at the time
of construction as an instrument for actual gas consumption per m2.20 The results show
that, keeping the other dwelling and household characteristics constant, as the actual gas
consumption is doubled, the market value of the dwelling decreases by around 24 percent
for non-certified dwellings and 20 percent for certified dwellings, which is in line with our
previous findings. The estimated coefficient is not statistically different for certified and
non-certified dwellings, which provides some indication that there is limited evidence to
argue that the salience of energy efficiency increases with the adoption of an EPC.21
20You can see the detailed first-stage and second stage estimation results in Appendix Table 4.B.7 and
Table 4.B.8, respectively
21It is important to note that, as documented by Aydin et al. (2014), the actual energy consumption
does not represent the exact efficiency level due to the existence of rebound effect. Therefore, the estimated
market value of a decrease in the level of actual gas consumption is expected to be larger than the value
of a decrease in the energy performance index (EPI), as it also captures the increased level of thermal
comfort. The first stage results also support the rebound effect hypothesis, as the increased U-value
has less impact on the actual gas consumption then it has on energy performance index, although not
statistically significant (Columns 2 and 3). This might also explain the larger coefficient we find by using
actual gas consumption compared to using the EPI.
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Table 4.7: IV Estimation Results for Non-certified and Certified Dwellings
(Non-certified) (Certified) (Certified)
Log(Actual Gas Cons. per m2) -0.239*** -0.195**
[0.052] [0.090]
Log(Energy Performance Index) -0.185***
[0.080]
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Construction Year Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.740 0.818 0.844
First Stage Results
U-value 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.069***
[0.004] [0.009] [0.006]
F statistic for excluded instrument 307.10 50.07 113.37
Number of observations 103,834 23,187 23,187
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
In all regressions, we include household characteristics, dwelling characteristics, construction year variable, neighborhood
and year of transaction dummies as control variables.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Household characteristics are: number of household members, number of children (age<18), number of elderly (age>65),
number of females and household net income.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
We also examine directly whether the energy label itself has an additional impact on
the transaction price. We apply a regression discontinuity (RD) approach based on the
rule that is used to assign dwellings in energy efficiency classes. The basic idea behind
this approach is that assignment to treatment is determined by the value of an observed
characteristic being on either side of a cutoff value (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The
main identifying assumption is that unobserved characteristics vary continuously with the
observable characteristic that is used in the assignment rule (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004).
We test whether there exists discontinuity in the transaction price of the dwelling around
the threshold values of EPI for different label categories. We focus on a narrow bandwidth
(±0.2 EPI) around the threshold values. In Figure 4.7, comparing the subsequent label
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categories, we plot the variation in the adjusted transaction price based on the energy
performance index around the cutoff points. We do not observe a clear discontinuity in
transaction price at the threshold points that are used to assign dwellings in different label
categories.
Figure 4.7: Transaction Price (adjusted) by Label Category and Energy Performance Index
Source: AgentschapNL, National Association of Realtors (NVM), authors’ calculations
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In order to formally test the potential labeling effect, we estimate the following model
for each threshold level:
Log(Pricei) = φ0 + φ1Log(EPI) + φ2DL.labeli Log(EPI) + φ3DL.labeli + φjXi + εi (4.4)
where DL.label is a dummy variable which is equal to one for the dwellings that were assigned
to the label indicating lower energy efficiency level, and zero otherwise. Xi is a vector of
dwelling characteristics. Log(EPI) and DL.labeli Log(EPI) control for the continuous effect
of the EPI on transaction price within each label category, and thus φ3 represents the impact
of label itself on transaction price, which is our parameter of interest. Table 4.8 reports the
estimates of φ3 for each threshold value that is used in the assignment to different label
categories. For all cutoff points, the estimated change in transaction price that results from
the assignment to a lower energy efficiency class is negative but not statistically significant.
Thus, there is not enough evidence to argue that the labeling itself has a significant impact
on the transaction price.
Table 4.8: Regression Discontinuity Estimation Results for Label Effect
(A-B) (B-C) (C-D) (D-E) (E-F) (F-G)
DL.label=1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.002 -0.000 - 0.007 -0.015
[0.029] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.011] [0.018]
Log(EPI) 0.171 -0.011 -0.019 -0.052 0.300** -0.055
[0.262] [0.085] [0.059] [0.089] [0.136] [0.270]
Log(EPI)*DL.label -0.433 -0.060 -0.088 -0.037 -0.494** 0.530
[0.312] [0.107] [0.093] [0.152] [0.224] [0.464]
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Construction Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.841 0.863 0.848 0.841 0.843 0.825
Number of obs. 1,461 6,879 11,009 6,899 4,606 2,146
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
We include dwelling characteristics, construction year variable, neighborhood and year of transaction dummies as control
variables in the regression.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood and transaction
year.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
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Finally, we examine whether the estimated value of energy efficiency varies over time.
By using actual gas consumption per m2 as a proxy for energy efficiency, we are able to
estimate the market value of residential energy efficiency for each year from 2003 to 2011.
As reported in Table 4.9, we find that the estimated coefficient increases from 2003 to 2011,
although the difference is not statistically significant. This can be partly explained by the
decreasing house prices after 2008 and the relative increase in energy costs (see Figure
4.8).22 Besides, the introduction of EPC in 2008 might also have a general influence on the
capitalization of energy efficiency (for both certified and non-certified dwellings), as it may
change the households’ perception of importance of energy efficiency.
22See Kahn (1986), Allcott and Wozny (2014), Busse et al. (2013) for the anlysis of how the market
value of fuel economy in the automobile sector is associated to the changes in gasoline prices.
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Table 4.9: Market Value of Energy Efficiency Over Time
Year Log(Gas Cons. per m2) N
2003 -0.156*** 42,346
[0.056]
2004 -0.177*** 42,847
[0.053]
2005 -0.144*** 48,702
[0.049]
2006 -0.202*** 48,632
[0.054]
2007 -0.160*** 47,976
[0.054]
2008 -0.175*** 39,030
[0.052]
2009 -0.302*** 28,742
[0.085]
2010 -0.319*** 30,768
[0.092]
2011 -0.248*** 28,936
[0.084]
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
In all regressions, we include household characteristics, dwelling characteristics, construction year variable, and
neighborhood dummies as control variables.
Dwelling characteristics are: dwelling size, dwelling type, quality, number of floors, number of rooms, type of parking
place, location of the dwelling relative to center, road, park, water and forest.
Household characteristics are: number of household members, number of children (age<18), number of elderly (age>65),
number of females and household net income.
We include both certified and non-certified dwellings in the analysis.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by neighborhood.
* P<0.1. ** P<0.05. *** P<0.01
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Figure 4.8: Value of Energy Efficiency and Gas Prices
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), International Energy Agency, National Association of Realtors (NVM), authors’
calculations
4.4 Conclusion
Enhancing residential energy efficiency has been a key element of debate among policy
makers, investors, and academics. Notwithstanding promising engineering estimates,
large-scale diffusion of energy efficiency enhancements in the single-family housing market
has been far from easy. One of the causes of such slow uptake is that the associated returns
to efficiency upgrades have not been identified convincingly. Requiring households to make
upfront investment for an uncertain return has been complicated further during the recent
period of financial liquidity constraints.
In this paper, we investigate how consumers capitalize energy efficiency in the
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housing market, and how the provision of an energy performance certificate affects this
capitalization rate. Although this is not the first paper to address this capitalization
process, most of the available evidence suffers from a common methodological drawback –
the potential bias that may arise due to omission of unobserved dwelling characteristics that
are correlated with measures of energy efficiency. This paper contributes to this literature
by proposing an instrumental variable approach to estimate the capitalization of energy
efficiency in the residential sector. We also contribute to the literature by examining the
impact of information provision, in the form of energy labels, on consumers’ valuation of
energy efficiency.
We examine a large representative dataset from the Netherlands, exploiting the
discontinuity in the energy efficiency levels of the newly constructed homes during the
1973-74 oil crisis, and the stringency of building codes at the time of construction as
instruments for energy efficiency. Our results indicate that the use of OLS leads to biased
estimates of the market value of energy efficiency. Using an IV approach, we find that if
the energy requirement of a dwelling is reduced by half, the market price of the dwelling
increases by around 11 percent for an average dwelling in the Dutch housing market. In
order to examine whether the capitalization of energy efficiency varies with the disclosure
of an EPC, we estimate the same model by using actual energy consumption as a proxy for
a common energy efficiency measure for certified and non-certified homes. Our findings do
not provide a significant evidence suggesting a higher capitalization rate for dwellings that
transacted with an energy performance certificate. We also use a regression discontinuity
approach to test whether labeling itself has a market value. The results show that there is
not a significant change in the transaction price at the threshold energy efficiency level that
is used to assign the dwellings into different label classes, which implies that the labeling
itself does not lead to a significant change in buyer’s valuation of the dwelling. Finally,
we examine the over-time change in the market value of energy efficiency, and document
that the value of energy efficiency has doubled from 2003 to 2011, which might be a result
of the increase in energy prices, the relative decrease in house prices after 2008 and the
general influence of policies and information campaigns stressing the importance of energy
efficiency.
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Our findings imply that, beyond the direct financial benefits from lower energy expenses,
residential energy efficiency improvements lead to higher transaction prices, regardless of
the provision of an energy label. From a policy perspective, the results of this paper
may be used to enhance the public awareness regarding the financial benefits of energy
efficiency investments. In order to facilitate the uptake of energy efficiency measures, the
financial benefits that homeowners can derive from energy efficiency improvements need to
be emphasized in the public information campaigns, and can also be incorporated into the
energy performance certification programs. In relation to “energy efficiency gap” literature,
our results also raise the question why energy efficiency investments in the housing sector
are far below the optimal level, given that the market value of, for example, insulation
is so much higher than its cost. The additional costs (such as the nuisance during the
retrofit work and the information costs), the risk of undervaluation of the energy efficiency
improvement in the market, liquidity constraints and the future discounting behavior might
be some of the reasons that lead to this sub-optimal outcome. Thus, more research needs
to be done to understand homeowners’ investment decisions, and accordingly cost-effective
policies need to be designed in a way to deal with these underlying reasons.
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Appendix
4.A Development of Oil Prices
Source: International Energy Agency
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4.B Supplementary Tables
Table 4.B.1: OLS Estimation Results: House Prices and Energy Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (Energy performance index) -0.235*** -0.106*** -0.052*** -0.048***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log (House size) 0.673*** 0.671*** 0.676***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of rooms 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of floors -0.013*** -0.017*** - 0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
House type=Semi-detached 0.129*** 0.112*** 0.109***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.031*** -0.033*** 0.033***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
House type=Detached house 0.318*** 0.296*** 0.292***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Parking place 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Only carport 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.074***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Only garage 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.143***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Garage and carport 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.171***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Garage for multiple cars 0.188*** 0.192*** 0.190***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.144***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.175*** -0.160*** -0.160***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.133***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Near forest 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.126***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Near waterside 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.076***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Near park 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Clear view 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Quality==0 -0.058** -0.055** -0.046*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Quality==1 -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.051***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Quality==2 0.458*** 0.450*** 0.443***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.103)
Construction-year 0.002***
(0.000)
Construction-year2 0.000***
(0.000)
Construction-year3 0.000***
(0.000)
Constant 5.580*** 1.851*** 1.779*** 1.899***
(0.017) (0.070) (0.074) (0.099)
Observations 30,036 30,036 30,036 30,036
R-squared 0.106 0.836 0.843 0.846
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking place”, for ”location
relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not specified”, for ”location relative to the road”
variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not specified”.
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Table 4.B.2: IV First-stage Estimation Results: Discontinuity in 1974
Construction Period (1950-1999) (1959-1990) (1967-1982)
D1974 -0.073*** -0.060*** -0.080***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Construction-year (until1974) -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Construction-year (after 1974) -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log of house size(m2) -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.066***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Number of rooms -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of floors 0.009** 0.011*** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
House type=Semi-detached 0.013** 0.007 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
House type=Detached house -0.005 0.002 0.020
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
Parking place -0.004 -0.010 -0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Only carport -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Only garage 0.004 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Garage and carport -0.020** -0.017 -0.027*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Garage for multiple cars -0.007 0.002 -0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.011 0.012 -0.012
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.021 0.004 -0.014
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.007 0.025 0.017
(0.024) (0.027) (0.035)
Near forest 0.013 0.018 0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
Near waterside -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Near park -0.000 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Clear view -0.003 -0.006 -0.016***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) 0.008 0.013 0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Quality==0 -0.061** -0.055** -0.072**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032)
Quality==1 -0.006 -0.017 -0.028
(0.018) (0.015) (0.022)
Quality==2 -0.094 -0.105* -0.093
(0.065) (0.060) (0.100)
Constant 0.988*** 0.947*** 0.885***
(0.062) (0.069) (0.124)
Observations 25,311 20,270 12,513
R-squared 0.445 0.362 0.258
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of energy performance index.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking
place”, for ”location relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not
specified”, for ”location relative to the road” variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not
specified”.
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Table 4.B.3: IV Second-stage Estimation Results: Discontinuity in 1974
Construction Period (1950-1999) (1959-1990) (1967-1982)
Log (Energy performance index) -0.198*** -0.185** -0.227**
(0.064) (0.085) (0.090)
Log of house size(m2) 0.613*** 0.597*** 0.595***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Number of rooms 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of floors -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
House type=Semi-detached 0.110*** 0.120*** 0.137***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.037*** -0.035*** - 0.039***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
House type=Detached house 0.324*** 0.342*** 0.365***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Parking place 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Only carport 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.059***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Only garage 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.145***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Garage and carport 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.161***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Garage for multiple cars 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.223***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.176*** -0.153*** -0.144***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.028)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.192*** -0.168*** -0.160***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.028)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.130***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.032)
Near forest 0.130*** 0.133*** 0.113***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Near waterside 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.067***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Near park 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Clear view 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) -0.026*** -0.028** -0.035***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Quality==0 -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.162***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032)
Quality==1 -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.132***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.028)
Quality==2 0.355** 0.350** 0.464***
(0.158) (0.165) (0.176)
Construction-year (until 1974) -0.002*** -0.001* 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Construction-year (after 1974) 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 2.295*** 2.344*** 2.400***
(0.082) (0.095) (0.106)
Observations 25,311 20,270 12,513
R-squared 0.854 0.852 0.852
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking
place”, for ”location relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not
specified”, for ”location relative to the road” variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not
specified”.
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Table 4.B.4: IV First-stage Estimation Results: U-value Requirements for Walls
U-value requirement for external walls 0.071***
(0.006)
House type=Semi-detached 0.004
(0.005)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.016***
(0.003)
House type=Detached house -0.014**
(0.007)
Log of house size(m2) -0.059***
(0.010)
Number of rooms -0.000
(0.002)
Number of floors 0.010***
(0.004)
Parking place -0.013**
(0.007)
Only carport -0.008
(0.007)
Only garage 0.005
(0.004)
Garage and carport -0.020**
(0.010)
Garage for multiple cars -0.020*
(0.010)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) 0.008
(0.016)
Location relative to the center (residential area) 0.001
(0.016)
Location relative to the center (center) 0.014
(0.018)
Near forest 0.003
(0.012)
Near waterside -0.005
(0.006)
Near park -0.002
(0.007)
Clear view 0.001
(0.004)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.001
(0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) 0.018*
(0.010)
Quality==0 -0.061**
(0.025)
Quality==1 -0.004
(0.015)
Quality==2 -0.128***
(0.044)
Construction-year -0.008***
(0.000)
Construction-year2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Construction-year3 -0.000***
(0.000)
Constant 0.768***
(0.054)
Observations 30,036
R-squared 0.414
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of energy performance index.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking
place”, for ”location relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not
specified”, for ”location relative to the road” variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not
specified”.
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Table 4.B.5: IV Second-stage Estimation Results: U-value Requirements for Walls
Log (Energy performance index) -0.214***
(0.074)
House type=Detached house 0.112***
(0.005)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.035***
(0.003)
House type=Detached house 0.294***
(0.007)
Log of house size(m2) 0.662***
(0.014)
Number of rooms 0.019***
(0.002)
Number of floors -0.015***
(0.004)
Parking place 0.047***
(0.006)
Only carport 0.074***
(0.007)
Only garage 0.147***
(0.004)
Garage and carport 0.169***
(0.009)
Garage for multiple cars 0.188***
(0.009)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.140***
(0.017)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.159***
(0.016)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.128***
(0.018)
Near forest 0.127***
(0.011)
Near waterside 0.077***
(0.006)
Near park 0.043***
(0.006)
Clear view 0.028***
(0.003)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.013***
(0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) -0.038***
(0.009)
Quality==0 -0.065**
(0.028)
Quality==1 -0.057***
(0.018)
Quality==2 0.430***
(0.099)
Construction-year 0 .000
(0.001)
Construction-year2 0.000***
(0.000)
Construction-year3 0.000***
(0.000)
Constant 1.920***
(0.095)
Observations 30,036
R-squared 0.837
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking
place”, for ”location relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not
specified”, for ”location relative to the road” variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not
specified”.
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Table 4.B.6: OLS Estimation Results based on Gas Consumption per m2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (Gas consumption per m2) -0.071*** 0.049*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.086***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Log of house size(m2) 0.813*** 0.802*** 0.720*** 0.632***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
Number of rooms 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of floors -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.020*** - 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
House type=Detached house 0.103*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.101***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025*** - 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
House type=Detached house 0.259*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.267***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Parking place 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.041***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Only carport 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Only garage 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.127***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Garage and carport 0.142*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.149***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Garage for multiple cars 0.140*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.178***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.133*** -0.140*** -0.145*** -0.186***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.171*** -0.205***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.176***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019)
Near forest 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.100***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
Near waterside 0.085*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Near park 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Clear view 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Location relative to the road (unspecified)
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Quality==0 -0.246*** -0.248*** -0.217*** -0.066**
(0.054) (0.053) (0.049) (0.028)
Quality==1 -0.041** -0.042** -0.046** -0.056***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Quality==2 0.098 0.082 0.070 0.182**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.072) (0.081)
Construction-year 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Construction-year2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Construction-year3 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of household members -0.040*** -0.044***
(0.002) (0.004)
Number of children (age<18) 0.026*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.004)
Number of elderly (age>64) 0.007*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.003)
Number of female 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.003)
Log (income) 0.174*** 0.158***
(0.003) (0.006)
Constant 5.701*** 1.049*** 0.887*** -0.403*** 0.211**
(0.021) (0.053) (0.053) (0.066) (0.103)
Observations 103,834 103,834 103,834 103,834 23,187
R-squared 0.010 0.756 0.774 0.794 0.855
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking place”, for ”location
relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not specified”, for ”location relative to the road”
variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not specified”.
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Table 4.B.7: IV Estimation First-stage Results for Non-EPC Sample
(1) (2) (3)
U-value requirement for external walls 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.069***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Construction-year -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Construction-year2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Construction-year3 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of house size(m2) -0.444*** -0.477*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
Number of rooms 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of floors -0.023*** -0.013*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
House type=Detached house 0.018*** 0.015** 0.007
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.123*** -0.118*** - 0.017***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
House type=Detached house 0.093*** 0.107*** - 0.023***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Parking place 0.025*** 0.024** -0.012
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008)
Only carport 0.016*** 0.024** -0.008
(0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Only garage 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.007
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Garage and carport 0.046*** 0.049*** -0.023**
(0.005) (0.015) (0.012)
Garage for multiple cars 0.036*** 0.052*** -0.015
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) 0.054*** -0.008 0.035*
(0.007) (0.021) (0.020)
Location relative to the center (residential area) 0.048*** -0.014 0.032
(0.007) (0.021) (0.020)
Location relative to the center (center) 0.059*** 0.016 0.037*
(0.008) (0.023) (0.022)
Near forest 0.030*** 0.064*** 0.004
(0.006) (0.014) (0.013)
Near waterside 0.013*** 0.011 -0.007
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
Near park 0.016*** 0.015 -0.005
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008)
Clear view 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.017
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Quality==0 -0.082** -0.023 -0.061*
(0.037) (0.049) (0.031)
Quality==1 -0.075*** -0.071** 0.021
(0.020) (0.032) (0.017)
Quality==2 -0.126** -0.332 -0.073**
(0.058) (0.238) (0.030)
Number of household members 0.013*** 0.024*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Number of children (age<18) 0.003 0.005 0.010**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Number of elderly (age>64) 0.072*** 0.051*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of female 0.019*** 0.014*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Log (income) 0.036*** 0.045*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Constant 4.179*** 4.367*** 0.825***
(0.036) (0.079) (0.075)
Observations 103,834 23,187 23,187
R-squared 0.392 0.375 0.417
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of gas consumption per m2.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking place”, for ”location
relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not specified”, for ”location relative to the road”
variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not specified”.
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Table 4.B.8: IV Estimation Second-stage Results for Non-EPC Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Gas consumption per m2) -0.239*** -0.195**
(0.052) (0.090)
Log (Energy performance index) -0.185**
(0.080)
Log of house size(m2) 0.569*** 0.500*** 0.587***
(0.022) (0.044) (0.013)
Number of rooms 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of floors -0.028*** -0.018*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
House type=Detached house 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.104***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
House type=Between or Townhouse -0.067*** -0.054*** - 0.035***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.003)
House type=Detached house 0.271*** 0.297*** 0.272***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
Parking place 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Only carport 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.064***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Only garage 0.123*** 0.144*** 0.134***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Garage and carport 0.140*** 0.163*** 0.149***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
Garage for multiple cars 0.155*** 0.193*** 0.180***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
Location relative to the center (unspecified) -0.126*** -0.187*** -0.179***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.018)
Location relative to the center (residential area) -0.154*** -0.208*** -0.199***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Location relative to the center (center) -0.140*** -0.171*** -0.168***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.019)
Near forest 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.106***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
Near waterside 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Near park 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Clear view 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Location relative to the road (unspecified) -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Location relative to the road (near a busy road) -0.051*** -0.029*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Quality==0 -0.246*** -0.074** -0.080***
(0.051) (0.033) (0.031)
Quality==1 -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.059***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quality==2 0.026 0.091** 0.142**
(0.066) (0.043) (0.061)
Construction-year -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Construction-year2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Construction-year3Construction-year 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of household members -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.045***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of children (age<18) 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of elderly (age>64) 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Number of female 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (income) 0.187*** 0.170*** 0.158***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 1.073*** 1.464*** 0.767***
(0.218) (0.418) (0.122)
Observations 103,834 23,187 23,187
R-squared 0.741 0.822 0.848
Notes:
Dependent variable is logarithm of transaction price.
The omitted categories are: for ”house type” variable it is ”Corner house”, for ”parking type” variable it is ”no parking place”, for ”location
relative to the center” variable it is ”outside the urban area”, for ”view type” variable it is ”not specified”, for ”location relative to the road”
variable it is ”near a quite road”, and for ”quality” variable it is ”not specified”.
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